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THE FINICKY COMPUTER, THE PAPERLESS TELEX
AND THE FALLIBLE SWISS: BANK TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW -
MARK BUDNITZ *
We live in a technological society.' Technology has produced medical equipment
which assists our birth and prolongs our life, computers which teach and entertain our
children, machines that have revolutionized the workplace and transformed our land-
scape. Banks are no exception to this development. 2 Financial institutions have applied
technology to their payment services in a variety of ways. Automated data processing,
computers and telecommunications systems have made electronic banking a reality.
Banks use automated equipment to process billions of checks. Telex machines are used to
wire money in commercial transactions from banks in one country to those in another.
Automated teller machines are as prevalent as self-service gas stations, and millions of
people receive their wages arid government benefits through electronic direct deposit. As
a result, courts and legislative bodies are struggling to determine the proper relationship
between bank technology and the legal system. This article seeks to facilitate that en-
deavor,
First, the general relationship between technology and society will be explored.Per-
sons disagree about the nature of thar relationship. Some believe technology is a vehicle
for our deliverance, others fear it is a vehicle for our destruction, still others feel it can be
harnessed and humanized to assist in furthering society's goals. It is necessary to under-
stand these attitudes because, consciously or not, the law often embodies one or another
of these views. This article will, therefore, first set forth the compel ing views of t he proper
relationship between technology and society.
The second par«rf the article examines the relationship between law and technology
within the specific context of electronic funds transfer (EFT)." EFT is the system used by
Copyright C) 1984 Boston College Law School.
* Associate Prolessor, Emory University School of Law; A.B., Dartmouth College, 1966; J.D.
Harvard Law School, 1969.
' See ger/era/iv V. FIR:KISS, TECHNOLOGICAL MAN: THE MYTH. AND THE REALITY (1969); E.
NlEsTHENE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1970); L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAw
(1973).
See generally COMPUTERS AND BANKING, ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC
Policy (K. Colton & K. Kraemer eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as COMPUTERS AND BANKING).
a For the purposes of this article, the term Electronic Funds Transfer is used in a general sense
to include everything from stoney transfers that are made solely by electronic equipment to paper-
based systems such as checks which use automated equipment only at certain processing stages. See
generally Gramks[aff & Smaistda, The Payments Mechanism —a Primer on Electronic funds Trawler, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF VHILADELPHIA Bus. REV., Sept. 1976, at 1, 7.
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banks to transfer money from one party to another and to otherwise process payment
transactions. The article discusses the law and bank technology' relationship from the
perspective of those who wish to "humanize -
 technology. The humanizer's perspective is
explored rather than the others because the others provide unsatisfactory resolutions to
the problems posed by EFT, Those who believe technology is our source of salvation
would impose no legal restrictions upon it since they think technology can do no wrong
and must be given free rein. This approach completely ignores the deleterious impact
which technology may have. In contrast, those who fear technology will destroy society
would seek to hamper the development and application of technology in every way
available to the legal system. They fail to recognize the many benefits which technology
can bri ng.
The article then analyzes two situations which illustrate the need to determine the
proper relationship between law and technology. First, a bank's failure to honor its
customer's stop payment order is analyzed in light of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), 4 case law, and a proposed Uniform New Payments Code (UN PC),' Second, the
legal implications of a bank's failure properly to transfer I unds electronically is explored.
Sonic of these bodies of law directly confront the issue of the relationship between bank
tech n ology' and the law, while others ignore it even though the legal rules they establish
necessarily reflect a view of that relationship. Those sources of law which do confront t lie
problem are in fundamental disagreement over what the relationship should be. This
disparity of treatment demonstrates the need for the legal system to reexamine commer-
cial law in light of technological developments. The final sections of this article will
therefOre examine these sources of law within the framework of the different value
systems and views of technology and society presented herein, in order to shed light on
he meaning and significance of these sources in a manner which is not possible when t hey
are evaluated solely within a legal context.
I. TECHNOLOGY, SOC/E:11 .
 AND THE LAW: COMPARATIVE: APPROACHES
Because technology has a pervasive impact on increasingly more aspects of our lives,
society must determine the proper relationship between technology, society and the law."
Developments in electronic banking technology raise the same types of issues as those
which result from advances in communications, transportation, industrial production and
biomedical engineering. Those who want to understand the challenge posed by computer
banking can gain valuable insights by putting this issue within the general context of an
examination of the role of technology and the law in society.
In an ideal world, the law would be an embodiment of society's values and norms.'
The proper function of the lawmaker would be to gather the data necessary to com-
prehend the social, economic and technical reality of a given situation and to develop a
rule of law which reflects society's value consensus. To determine the appropriate rela-
Unless otherwise specifically indicated, all references in this article to the Uniform Commercial
Code are to the 1978 Official Text.
5
 UmFokm NEW PAYMENTS CODE (Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code, Draft No. 3, June 2, 1983) (hereinafter cited as U.N,P.C.].
See generally, L. TRIRE,,Mpra note 1.
7
 Sec generally E. Scrum, LAW AND SOCIETY 82 (1968); Bredemeier, Law as an Integrative Mecha-
nism, in LAW AND SOCIE.TV 126 (C. Campbell & P. Wiles eds. 1979); Parsons, The Law and Sochi Cmarol,
in THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 60, 60-61 (W. Evan ed. 1980).
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tionship between law and technology, the lawmaker would ascertain the attitude of
Americans towards technology and the values attributed to it.
In the real world, however, the lawmaker faces a more difficult task. Various seg-
ments of society have greatly diverse attitudes towards technology — attitudes which
reflect their values. These attitudes may be a product of the interest groups with which
they most closely identify: doctors, blue collar workers, business people, evangelicals,
consumers, government bureaucrats, and the like."
Some people, for example, believe in "Technological Messianism." 9 Technology,
according to this view, is an "unalloyed blessing,- "the motor of all progress... 1° It is "what
has made man man."" Consequently, technology has the capacity to solve all of society's
problems. 12 Proponents of this view equate technology with progress and believe law
should not do anything to restrict technology unless there is a clear proven threat to
health or safety.
At the opposite extreme are the prophets of doom who believe technology is an
"unmitigated curse.'' They fear that it robs people of jobs, privacy and dignity. They
believe that it fosters a bureaucratic state which destroys personal freedom and may make
the world "totally uninhabitable."'
Also complicating the lawmaker's attempt to determine the proper relationship
between law and technology are the different perceptions people have of society's ability
to control technology. These range from the determinist who believes that it is not
possible to exercise effective contml, to those who are confident that society can control
technology without difficulty. The humanizer believes the truth lies somewhere in be-
tween these two extremes.
A. Technology Cannot Be Controlled
Some believe people have little or no power to control technology.' 5 This is often
referred to as technological "determinism"' or "autonomous" technology. '' Adherents to
this belief feel technology "has become an end in itself', controlling both men and their
society."'" Man is seen as passive, forced to adapt to technology, rather than a master of
his fate.' According to this view, "[Man] in fact has no choice but to push forward with
Kling, Value Conflicts and Social Choice in Electronic Funds Transfer System Developments, 8 COM-
NIUNICATIONS. or THE ACA 642, 643-44 (Aug. 1978). Lawmaking is further complicated when
technology changes society's values because of the new options it creates. See E. MEsTHENE,SUpra note
1, at 98, 50.
9 V. FERKISS, supra note I, at 60.
Mestliene, The Role of Technology in Society, in TEcum.u.oc:v AND MAN'S FUTURE 156, 156 (A.
Teich, ed. 1977).
" V. FERKISS, supra note 1, at 29.
I S !Aesthetic, supra note 10, at 56.
I Id.
" L. TRIBE, supra note I , at 2, see generally J. ELLUL, The Technological Society (1964).
'5 V. FERKISS, .supra note 1, at II; see generally J. Et,Lur,, supra note 14.
16 V. FERKISS, supra note 1, at 30. This school of thought believes technology controls "social
forms and cultural norms." Id. See also Kraemer &Colton, An Agenda Jar EFT Research, in COMPUTERS
AND BANKING, .supra note 2, at 243, 264.
Winner, On Criticizing Technology, in A. Teich, ed., supra note 10, at 354, 360.
1 " V. FERKISS, supra note 1, at 14.
19 Winner, supra note 17, at 362.
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this technology. The world is irrevocably committed to a technological culture." 20 The
omnipotent engine of technology moves relentlessly forward, and humans are powerless
to stop it.
The determinists may come from one of three camps. They may believe technology is
evil, is our salvation, or is a mixed blessing. Whatever their view of the nature of
technology, they share the belief that technology will determine the structure of society
and the quality of life. People who think this way treat technology as an independent
variable," the "determinant" which sets conditions limiting other forces and social organi-
zations in society.' They regard society as the dependent variable and believe social
institutions such as law must he consistent with technological needs. They contend that
values and conduct must adapt to technology.
B. Technology Can Be Controlled Easily
At the other end of the spectrum are those who believe man can easily control
technology and make it accomplish only those objectives which are beneficial to society.
Some acknowledge that technology does have an impact on social organization, but think
technological itIvances, including EFT, can be used as vehicles of social change to
significantly alter present social arrangements.' Others do not question die ability to
control teclincAligy, but also do not perceive that it has a great impact on society."
Moreover, they believe individuals can easily adapt to whatever changes do result from
technology. 2 '
Under this view, for example, EFT is seen as merely a new type of payment system,
raising no more significant social issues than the introduction of the money order or the
cashier's check.'" When deciding the proper relationship between the law and EFT
technology, these people think the task consists primarily of determining whether EFT is
most analogous to checks, cash or credit cards. Once that determination is made, adhe-
rents to this approach contend all one has to do is apply the law governing the most
analogous existing payment system to EFT.
C. Technology Can Be Humanized
Finally, there are persons who take a middle position. These persons will he referred
to as the "humanizers." 27
 Huinanizers reject technological determinism; they believe
2" Winner, supra note 17, at 360 (quoting statement of Prof. Harvey Brooks in 1969 before a
Senate Subcommittee).
2 ' V. FEI2KISS, supra note 1, at 30; Winner, .supra note 17, at 365.
22
 2 NI. RIL•S', SOCIOLOGICAL RP:SEARCH 138 (1963).
27 Kraemer & Colt on,.vutasi note Ili, at 264. "(Slotne of us who would really like to challenge the
fundamental assumptions on which our political system, our economic system, and maybe even the
religious basis of our society rest, have decided to use EFT as the vehicle for it today.
-
 Id. at 244
(quoting E. Cox).
" Mest hene, supra note 10, at 157.
25 Id.
20 Kraemer & Colton, supra note 16, at 244. " [TIhe early advocates of EFT placed too much
emphasis on technical feasibility and showed too little understanding of the social and institutional
meanings and context of EFT." Id.
" See generally Sterling, Humanizing Computerized itOrmation Systems, 190 Science 1168 (1975).
There is, of course, no group or formal school of thought known its "humanizers" of technology. In
addition, to my knowledge, none of those 1 would characterize as humanizers have - addressed
themselves to many of the specific banking technology issues presented in this article. Nevertheless,
there are numerous scholars, each of whom views technology through his or her own unique
perspective, but all of whom generally seem to take the approach described in the text.
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people can influence the shape and impact of technology." At the same time they
recognize technology does have a dark side: it definitely has a social dimension, 29 it has
dysfunctional as well as functional effects,"" it may benefit certain groups in society while
being of no benefit or causing harm to others.' In Order to take advantage of the new
technology, humanizers believe there will have to be changes in the social organization of
society, causing interference with the functions of existing social st ruct tires."'
Social structures, however, often fulfill several societal functions. Changing them to
accommodate technology may make them better able to achieve some goals, but render
them useless in achieving others. For example, advances in biomedical science and
technology led to increased specialization and concentration of the specialists in urban
centers." The result was greatly improved treatment of serious illness. But this develop-
ment also led to the decline of the general practitioner and the unavailability of physicians
in small towns and rural areas. Similarly, EFT has many advantages, but it also may enable
banks to close many branches, contribute to greater bank concentration, and lead to
pricing which discourages the use of checks and credit cards. 34
 While obtaining the
benefits of EFT, customers may lose many of the functions served by the community bank
or the local branch.'" Customers gain an automated teller machine, an "ATM," but may
lose the option of dealing with a human teller.'
The humanizers do not oppose technology per ,se, but are determined to seek an
appropriate accommodation between humans and technology. They seek to "humanize"
technology 37
 before it "dehumanizes" people," but they also believe technology can be an
instrument to foster the humanization of society. They regard technology as one of man's
tools"9
 and feel that it should be used to increase man's capacity to create a better life, not
to give one person the ability to exploit another. They want to keep society's options open,
and oppose irreversible technological decisions."
This opposition to irreversible decisions is based on Iwo concerns. One arises from
the short "useful life" 4 ' of such decisions. A developing technology continuously alters the
" Neil, Re-humanizing the Man-Machine Relationship, 30 IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOC. 115 (1980).
The machine is a tool. Id. at 119. It should be used to extend human capacity. Id.
' 9 1- TRIBE, .supra note 1, at 48.
Mesthene, supra note 10, at 172.
3 ' Hitt z & Turoff, EFT and Social Stratification in the USA, TELECOM. POCY, March 1978, 22 at 22.
32 Mesthene, supra note 10, at 160.
'!" Id. at 160-61.
34 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOCY ASSESSMENT, SELECTED ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ISSUES, PRI-
VACY, SECURITY AND EQUITY 60, 63, 69, 73 (undated) [hereinafter cited as OTAj; see generally
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND 'TRANSFERS, EFT IN THE UNITED STATES, POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE Putm.rc INTEREST, FINAL REPORT 83, 150 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
NCEFT]; Whittle, Banks Should Rally Round Generic Checking, AM. BANKER, May 25, 1983, at 4, col. I.
" OTA, supra note 34, at 60, 63; Mulcahy, Groups Push for Action on Closings, AM. BANKER, July
18, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
.	 "" See, e.g. , Gross, Citibank Says Teller Policy Was a Mistake, A.m. BANKER, May 25, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
For a period of lime, Citibank instituted a policy whereby customers with less than $5,000 on deposit
were not allowed to use human tellers for routine transactions. Id. Those customers were required to
use automated teller machines. Id.
° Sterling, supra note 27.
" Man mitst dominate technology because otherwise technology will change man to a being of
"lesser potentialities" due to its inferior capacity for being flexible and versatile. V. FERK1SS, supra
note I, at 255.
" Neill, supra note 28.
40 L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 21, 49.
41 Mes thene, supra note 10, at 174.
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"spectrum of choices and prohlems."2
 A decision made today may need to be altered next
month. A second consideration is the synergistic nature of technology.'" New technologies
combine with current technologies; technology developed in one area is combined wit h
technology from another. Electronic funds transfer, for example, represents the "syner-
gistic capability generated by the merging of the digital computer and advancements in
telecommunications."'" This synergism in part explains the phenomenon of ever-
increasing "technological dist ance." 45
 Technological applications have "increasingly wider
ramifications and ... increasingly large concentrations of people and organizations be-
come dependent on technical systems." 6
 An unwise irreversible decision can therefore
have a substantial deleterious impact on society.
Irreversible decisions are not the only type of decisions the humanizers oppose. They
also fear society will be locked in by the "tyranny of small decisions." 47
 They believe that
when individual entrepreneurs develop and deploy technological innovations, their pri-
mary objective is to minimize cost and maximize profits. Humanizers think t hat entrep-
reneurs do not necessarily take into sufficient account the probable costs and benefits to
others and to society generally. Technology then becomes the product of "innumerable
individual decisions to develop individual technologies for individual purposes
Each decision may appear reasonable at the time it is made. But the end result may be a
technological configuration which is not socially desirable.
In addition to opposing "small decisions," t he humanizer rejects the deterministic
conception of technology. He attempts instead to use technology as an instrument of
society. Because of the differences in values and priorities among various groups in
society, however', humanizers must first identify those values and priorities, and then
determine what mechanism can most successfully resolve these conflicts and realize the
goal of using technology as an instrument of society. In going through this process, the
humanizer attempts to reach an accommodation among as many different groups as
possible.
In seeking agreement from various groups, the humanizer opposes those who would
allow any one group to decide how technology shoold be deployed. As one commentator
has admonished, "[wlhat is required is that all participants in technological civilization
recognize t
 hat the one intolerable action is the claim of any individual or group within it to
dominance and universality, for this would quite literally short-circuit the total cultural
process.' The humanizer contends, therefore, that it is especially unwise to defer to the
preferences of one group because technological advances create "an ever-thicker pattern
of interaction and interdependency, one which requires means for consciously taking the
interests of others into account
42 Id.
4" King & Kraemer, Electronic Funds Transfer as a Subject of Study in Technology, Society and Public
Policy, TELECOM, PoCv, at 13, 13, 20 (March, 1978).
44
 Id.
45
 Mesthene, supra note 10, at 174.
46 Id
47
 L. TRIBE, supra note I, at 7; Kling, supra 'tole 8, at 655.
4"
 L. TRIBE, supra nose 1, at 7 (quoting Mesthene, The Role of Technology in Society: Some General
implications of the Program's Research, in HARVARD UNIVERSITY PROGRAM IN erECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY,
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 1967-68, (1968); see also V. FERKISS, supra note I, at 259,
49
 V. FERKISS, supra note I, at 258.
50
 Id. at 259.
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11. TIIE HUMANIZER'S APPROACH TO EFT TECHNOLOGY AND THE. LAW
The humanizer's perspective offers the most fruitful context for exploring the
relationship between EFT technology and the law. Adherents to the other approaches are
extreme and one-dimensional. They either believe technology is perfect and can do no
harm, or fear that technology is irredeemably evil. They insist t hat technology cannot be
regulated by law because it is uncontrollable, or claim that technology need not be
regulated in any way because it has no significant impact on society. 'Die humanizer
rejects these opposing camps because none takes a balanced and realistic view. None
offers a perspective which confronts t he problematic nature of technology. None explores
the issue of how law might deal constructively with technology.
Instead, the humanizer tries to take into account the pluralistic world in which
decisions concerning EFT technology occur. This requires taking into account t he various
value orientations of the principal participants — banks, customers and the government
— in EFT systems. Professor Kling has constructed several models fruitful for studying
this problem . 51
1) Private enterprise model. The preeminent. consideration is profitability..
Other social goods such as users' privacy ... are secondary.
2) Statist model. The strength and efficiency of government institutions are
the highest goals....
3) [Customer oriented model.]" The practices of public agencies and private
enterprises should be easily intelligible to ordinary citizens and be respon-
sive to their needs.... [Libertarian values such as privacy should be
maximized in social policy decisions.]
4) System.s. model. The main goal is that EFT systems be technically  well-
organized, efficient, reliable, and aesthetically pleasing.
These models do not purport to list all of the values of each group, but only those
which are most important to each. Other values may be deemed less important by the
group. Alternatively, the group may oppose other values or remain indifferent.
The groups employing the various models are not necessarily opposed to one an-
other. In banking, for example, if most customers strongly value their privacy and insist
on payment systems which protect it, banks will safeguard their privacy because that is
one way in which to increase their customer base and their profits. Similarly, both those
adhering to t he values of the private enterprise model and the customer-oriented model
generally would support the Systems model. The perspective of each group, however, is
different, as arc the facets of bank technology which arc of primary concern to each. As a
result, when t hey examine the deployment of electronic equipment, each regards it within
the context of its own value system and describes and evaluates it in starkly different
terms.
In the electronic banking arena, the situation is vastly more complicated than Kling
portrays in his models. 53 This can be seen by focusing attention on the interest groups
which share the values embodied in the models. Financial institutions value the profitabil-
51 Kling, supra note 8, at 643.
" This model is a combination of two of Kling's models which he labels "neopopulist" and
"libertarian." Id. While important, libertarian values are not addressed in this article.
sa See, e.g.. Kling, supra note 8, at 644 n.5. For instance, Kling suggests that in discussing the
relationship between the models and various interest groups, consumers could be categorized into
four different groups. Id.
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ity of EFT systems. But beyond that, their views on the relationship between law and
electronic banking may vary greatly depending on whether they want to run their own
system or a shared system, and whether they want to market electronic checking, point of
sale transfers, automated teller machines, direct deposit of payroll checks, or interna-
tional wire transfers. Bank customers are comprised of commercial customers and indi-
vidual consumers. Commercial customers value the profitability of electronic banking to
them, not its profitability to financial institutions. They may also share the Libertarian's
concern for the privacy of transactions and the Systems people's regard for reliability.
Consumers may most highly value privacy, cost, convenience, security. or "customer
friendly" systems. Their hierarchy of values probably varies considerably depending
upon whether they are rich or poor, urban or rural, and young or elderly. The federal
government has t he Statist's values. it has an interest. in maintaining a strong, safe and fair
national payments system:" The public interest requires that no segment of the popula-
tion be entirely cut off from the system since access to a convenient affordable payment
mechanism is essential for every citizen's welfare." To insure the smooth functioning of'
the economy, the system should operate at a minimum level of performance. The
government's values are influenced by its roles as regulator, as user, and as one of the
main operators of the payments system."
A dilemma confronts those who share the humanizers' perception of the nature of
technology, us relationship to society, and the need for EFT technology to develop within
a framework which seeks to reach an accommodation among the diverse interests of
various segments of the public. On the one hand, their recognition of the dark side of
technology and their desire to insure that technology is used for the betterment of society
as a whole point to the use of law as an instrument to control and guide technology. The
humanizers oppose those who would withhold legal intervention until there is proof of
definite harm caused by a given technology, harm which clearly outweighs the benefits
brought by the technology. They believe experience has shown that if we wait until a
technology can be proven harmful, it is too difficult and costly to make necessary
changes," In regard to EFT, commentators have noted that because the technology is
very expensive, problems must be addressed as early as possible." "['The size of the
investments in EFT will generate resistance to future change.""
On the other hand, the humanizer's fear of irreversible decisions," recognition of the
short useful life of technological decisions' and understanding of synergism, 62 suggest a
54
 OCC, CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING SUPPORT, OCG BANKING
CIRCULAR 177 (May 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as OCC BANKING CIRCULAR 177]. OTA, supra note
24, at 46, 73-74; Garsson, Fed Pricing is Criiicized and Praised, Mt. BANKER, June 16, 1983, p.1, col. 3,
at 10. "The Fed is viewed as a guarantee of universal access [for financial institutions] to funds
transfer systems." See generally E. MESTIIENE,SUpra note 1, at 39, 69 on the role of government in the
l'ace of technological developments which increasingly impact society in general and which, there-
fore, should not be left solely to private decisions.
ss NCEFT, .copra note 24, al 71-73; A. D. Livrt.E, TUE CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS
-TRANSFER 126-30 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A.D. LITTLE]. OTA, supra note 34, at 60, 64; Hillz &
Turoff, supra note 31.
" NCEFT, supra note 34, at 207-19.
m L. TRIBE, SUPTO note I, at 23; Kraemer & Colton, supra note 16, at 248; Winner, su ra note 17,
at 368.
" Kraemer & Colton, .cupro note 16, at 248.
" Id.
" See .supra text accompanying note 40.
si See supra text accompanying note 41.
62
 See supra text accompanying note 43.
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resistance to laws which lock technology into one direction or into limited applications.
They acknowledge the conflicting interests and values involved and the impossibility of
scientifically balancing them because values such as privacy and the preservation of future
options cannot be quamilied. 63 They know that because we are unable to "imagine all the
possible uses of new technologies,"" there is no way to have an "adequate perception of
[their] social and environmental consequences."
The most suitable approach to the humanizer, therefore, would be to establish,
through statutes or case law, private rights and obligations, 63 set the balance of power
between interacting parties, and mandate minimum standards of conduct. An institu-
tion's technology would have to perform in a manner consistent with the obligations and
standards developed by the law in order to protect the institution from liability. This
approach would place no explicit limits upon technology. Rather, it would reflect the
traditional view that the law should he determined without special attention to technol-
ogy. Society should determine, for example, what legal rules and standards should
regulate customer-bank relations. Due regard should be had for the legal relationship
between the parties, the reasonable expectations of the customer, and the reasonable
commercial practices of the bank. These factors would constitute the "independent
variables," the determinants. Technology would be treated as a dependent variable.
The remainder of this article will analyze two areas of banking which involve disputes
between customers and banks using electronic equipment. These two areas were chosen
because the law which has been developed and proposed in deal with these disputes
illustrates the various approaches to the relationship between technology, society and the
law discussed above. By examining the cases and statutes, determining what approach
they take to that relationship, and analyzing t he result. in terms of the rights and liabilities
of the parties, it is possible to evaluate current and proposed laws from a new perspective.
III.  TI ► E RIG FIT TO ST01. PAYMENT CONFRONTS THE COMPUTER
Stop payment cases provide a fruitful source for exploring the relationship between
law and technology. Before the advent of sophisticated automated equipment, banks
asked customers wishing to stop payment on a check to supply information which would
help the bank to identify the check in question. This information typically included the
account number, amount of the check, name of the payee, check !lumber and date on t he
check. The bank would search for the check manually, based on t he information pro-
vided. If t he customer made a minor mistake in reporting the amount of the check, the
bank could nevertheless find the check by using the other information supplied by the
customer. The courts provided incentives to encourage finding these checks by holding
F" Brooks & Bowers, Technology: Process of Assessment and Choice, in A. Teich, ed., supra note 10, at
229, 235.
" Id.
" See L. TRIBE, supra note L at 54-55. This approach is subject to severe limitations. As pointed
out by Tribe,
It remains true, however, that reliance on voluntary private enforcement of claims to
compensation, whet her by individuals or in class actions, tends to be ill-suited to
technological effects too weakly associated with presently existing and identifiable
individuals, or too thinly spread among such individuals, to arouse their organized
opposition in a timely way.
Id. at 55.
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that banks were liable if they did not stop payment when the customer's reporting error
was minor.
Today, many banks rely only on the account number and the reported amount of the
check to process stop payment orders. This information is fed into electronic equipment
which is able to find the check based on these numbers alone. If the customer reports an
amount which is in any respect incorrect, however, the equipment often is unable to find
the check and the bank will not stop payment on it. As a result, checks on which payment
was stopped despite minor reporting mistakes in the nonelectronic environment may not
be stopped when modern equipment is used.
The cases involving stop payment where the bank's automated process fails to find
checks because of a customer's minor reporting error force the courts to determine the
extent to which legal principles will be applied to accommodate either the needs of bank
computers or the frailties of hank customers. They present t he most difficult fact pattern
for courts which are inclined to stem the tide of technology. In each instance the bank has
made a reasonable business decision to use electronic equipment. Although the customer
has suffered loss, the loss was not caused by a computer malfunction, but by the customer
who reported inaccurate information to the bank. The bank's computers failed to stop
payment only because of that misinformation. Because the infOrmation given to the bank
would be adequate in a nonelectronic system, however, courts cannot simply find for the
bank. In such a system the court would have found the bank liable, upholding the
customer's legal tight to Stop payment.
In cases involving customer error, therefore, the court must decide whether the
bank's introduction of computers should have the effect of switching the loss from the
batik to the customer, all other conditions remaining the same. Whether or not t hey are
consciously doing so, in deciding where to place the loss courts both reflect and apply
important jurisprudential positions on issues involving the relationship between law and
technology.
A. stop Payment Under the Uniform Corimercial Code
The official version of the UCC provides in section 4-403(1) that the customer has a
"right" to stop payment." There is no requirement that the customer have a legitimate
reason for refusing to authorize his hank to honor the check. As long as his stop payment
order is "received at such time and in such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable
opportunity to act on it,"" the bank is obligated to stop payment.
The Official Comment justifies this customer right by stating that,  "stopping payment
is a service which depositors expect and are emit led to receive from banks notwithstand-
ing its difficulty, inconvenience and expense. The inevitable occasional losses through
failure to stop should he borne by the banks as a cost of the business of banking. -" While
one court has seized upon this Comment to build a theory of 'customer expectation,'"
others rationalize the Code's grant of this right by examining the nature of a check.'"
w U.C.C. § 4 -403(1) (Official Text 1978). The U.C.C. labels stop payment a right in the caption
to the section. Id. Captions are considered part of the text of the U.C.C. Id. § 1 - 109.
67
 Id. § 4-403(1).
" Id. § 4.403 official comment 2 (1978).
" FJS Electronics, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 288 Pa. Super. 138, 142, 431 A.2d 326, (1981).
7° See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank, 161 F. Supp. 790, 791-92 (D. Mass.
1958). Although the Universal case was based on the Negotiable Instruments Law, the court correctly
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Under the UCC, a check "does not of itself operate as an assignment. . . 	 The check is
merely an instruction by the drawer-customer to the bank to pay. Until the customer's
hank decides to pay the check, neither the payee nor any other holder of the check has
any tight to payment. It follows from these principles that the customer has the right to
revoke his instruction to the batik to pay if the check has not yet been paid."
The right to stop payment, therefore, is a crucial and integral aspect of the legal
relationship both between the customer and his bank, and the customer and the payee
and other holders. The importance of this right can be seen in cases and commentaries
questioning the ability of banks to limit the right through clauses in contracts and to
charge fees for exercising the right." The Attorney General of Michigan, for example,
issued an opinion stating that banks may not require customers to pay a fee in order to
stop payllICIII. 74 He quoted from authorities who assert that the customer has unlimited
discretion to stop payment, the right to stop payment is an implied term of the deposit
contract, and charging a fee disrupts the risk allocation scheme of the UCC. Banks,
therefore, could not burden or condition the right to stop payment by requiring a fee.
R. The Ell'ed of Technology on Bonk Processing of
Slop Payment Orders
Electronic equipment has changed greatly the way in which banks process stop
payment orders. Virtually every bank uses MICR 75 encoded checks beating the account
number and possibly the check number in special characters which can be read by
automated equipment.'" When t lie check is deposited by the payee or other holder, the
depository bank inserts the amount of the check in MICR characters. After the check
returns to the customer's bank, it is processed along with many thousands of other checks
by high speed automated equipment. If a customer submits a stop payment order, t he
bank programs its computer to pull the check the customer wants stopped out of the
quickly-flowing stream of checks." The bank does this typically by programming the
computer to segregate the check whose MICR encoded account number and amount
correspotid to t hat reported by the customer." If the customer does not report the precise
amount of the check, the computer will never find the check and it will be paid.'"
noted that the same reasoning applies under the U.C.C. and that the U.C.C.'s treatment of this issue
is primarily a restatement of prior law. Id. See also B. CLARK, "I HE LAW OF' BANK DEPOSITS, CoLLEc-
TioNs AND CREDIT CARDS, 2-40 (1981).
71 U.C.C.	 3-409(1) (1978).
v= See Universal	 Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Rank, 161 F. Stipp. 790, 791-92 (D. Mass.
1958). See also infra note 77.
7 ' Op, An'y Gen. 25 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 238 (Conn. 1978); Op. An)/ Gen. 30
U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGuAN) 1026, 1627-28 (Mich. 1981); Op. Att'y Gen. 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
(CALLAGHAN) 115 (Utah 1966); B. CLARE, MipTa note 70, at 2-41; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
CCIMMERCIAL CODE 653-55 (2d ed. 1980).
74 Op, Att'y Gen. 30 U.C.C. REF'. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1626, 1627 (Mich. 1981).
75 B. CLARK, supra note 70, at 8-10. MICR refers to the magnetic ink character recognition
system in which checks are "encoded" with M1CR numbers, numbers which computers can read and
be programmed to process automatically. Id.
71;
See, e.g., Delano v. Putnam Trust Co., 33 U.C.C.	 SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 635, 636-37 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1981).
See EIS Electronics, Inc. V. Fidelity Bank, 288 Pa. Super. 138, 140, 431 A.2d 326, 327 (1981).
79 Id.
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Banks have switched to electronic equipment for many sound business reasons. For
example, those machines can process checks at much greater speeds and much lower cost
than more primitive technological systems. That speed is crucial in light of the astronomi-
cal number of checks which arc processed every day . 8" Wit flout the adoption of technolog-
ical advances to check processing, the cost to banks, and subsequently to their customers,
would be so high as to render the use of checks far less feasible. At the same lime, I he
greater speed means that the customer has less time to exercise his right to stop payment
In addition, many bank systems are totally inflexible and incapable of dealing with the
most trivial human error in ordering the stop payment.
This rigidity is in stark contrast to less technologically "advanced" systems. Banks
using more "primitive" systems had a reasonable tolerance for error. For example,
customers often would correctly report the name of t he payee, the date the check was
issued, and the check number, but make a one digit mistake in reporting the amount of
the check. Many courts applied a "de minimu.s" test' in such cases, and assumed that the
bank had considered all of the information supplied by the customer. Where the cus-
tomer had supplied the correct information listed above, normally the bank would have
no trouble identifying which check was subject to the stop payment order despite the
customer's minor reporting error."' Consequently, the bank had a "reasonable opportu-
nity" to act on the stop payment order and was liable for its failure to act."
With the adoption of computers, however, banks have begun to rely on two items of"
t he account number and check amount. None of the other information is
fed into the computer because the computer processes only those two items. Alt hough t he
amount of intim -nation upon which the computer acts is reduced drastically that informa-
tion must now be absolutely accurate." There can be no de minimus errors; any error, no
matter how trivial it may be to humans, is catastrophic for many computers because that
error renders t hem completely helpless. 85
Courts must decide how to apply t he legal right the stat Lite confers on the customer in
light of this technological challenge. On the one hand, if the court maintains the status
quo by considering the amount and accuracy of the information supplied by the customer
and applying the de min lotus rule, many bank computer systems will be unable to process
stop payment orders in a manner which will protect the hank from liability. On the other
E See, e.g., 14'rameworh for Change, ECON. REV., FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, Aug. 1983, at 6,
12. The Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank estimates, that in 1979, 32 billion checks were written on
accounts at commercial banks. Id.
81 See Delano v. Putnam Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 635, 638-39 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1981) and cases cited therein,
82 See Elsie Rodriguez Fashions v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 23 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN)
133, 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers Nat'l Bank, 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
(CALLAGHAN) 1273, 1275-76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
" See, e.g., Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers Nat'l Bank, 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN')
1273, 1275-76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) ("Enough information was supplied to the bank to reasonably
provide it with sufficient information to comply with the stop payment order.").
8'
	 discussed below, some banks use computers which can tolerate a margin of error. See infra
notes 180-95 and accompanying text. Most of the cases involve computers which apparently lacked
this ability. See, e.g.., Poullier v. Nacua Motors, 108 Misc. 2d 913, 914, 349 N.Y.S.2d 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981); FJS Electronics, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1462 (Pa. Ct.
Common Pleas 1980).
es Poullier v, Nacua Motors, 108 Misc.2d 913, 914, 439 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
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hand, if the court applies the "reasonable opportunity" standard in a manner which is
consistent with computer operations, the customer right granted by the UCC, given
human propensity fOr making trivial errors and the computer's incapacity for tolerating
such errors, will be seriously undermined. The f011owing sections will examine the various
positions developed by the case law, explain how they reflect fundamental theoretical
approaches to the relationship between law and technology, and suggest an approach
which best resolves the issues presented.
C. Cases Requiring Custontert To Be As Precise As Computers .
When confronted with the limitations of bank technology, some courts have required
customers stopping payment to report information in the absolutely accurate manner
required by the bank's computers." One court's rationale seemed to he that since it is
reasonable for banks to install cpmputers, it is fair to require customers to give the
computer whatever it needs." A Florida court has based its decision on that state's
nonuniform provisions of the UGC which demand more of the customer than does the
official version by requiring the customer to describe the check with certainty." An in-
dept h analysis of these decisions reveals that these courts have treated technology as an
independent variable." Their decisions seem to reflect a view of technological "deter-
minism" or "autonomous - technology,'"' in so far as they force people to adapt to the needs
of computers rather than the reverse.
In Poulher v. Noma Motors," for example, the customer supplied the bank with the
dollar amount of the check to he stopped, but made a one digit mistake." 2 The court
rejected the customer's contention that such a mistake should not relieve the bank of its
responsibility to stop payment.''" The court did not consider what constituted sufficient
information under analogous UCC cases where computer capability was not in issue. The
court, therefore, never had to address the possibility that but for the introduction of
electronic technology, the customer would have won the case. Instead, attention was
focused almost entirely upon the needs of computers. Computers were characterized as
being "quite finicky."' The court. noted that a one digit mistake may be trivial to a human,
but "can be a world of difference to a computer.' The judge stated that a computer is
"not unlike an infant of tender years- as it "is totally dependent on being spoon-fed by a
human world.""
Asa result of the Ponlher decision, itt order for the customer to be able to retain his
legal right to stop payment, he must substantially change his conduct. Customer conduct
which was perfectly acceptable precomputer is now totally unacceptable. Such conduct
" Id. at 913, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
"7 Id. at 914, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
"" Capital Bank v. Schuler, 421 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
" Id. at 637; Poullier v. Nacua Motors, 108 Misc. 2(.1 913, 914, 439 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86, (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1981); me note 115 and accompanying text.
"" Id.
9 ' 108 Misc. 2d 913, 429 N.Y.S.2d 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
92 Id. at 913, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 86. The customer reported the amount as $4,287,65.M. The check
actually was drawn in the amount of $4,247.65. Id.
"I id. at 914, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
"' Id.
"' Id.
99 Id.
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now must be consistent with what the infantile "finicky - computer demands. Reasonable-
ness is determined not by what a customer would legitimately consider reasonable, but by
what a primitive technological creature requires.
The Pouflier court apparently regarded computer technology as an independent.
variable. Under Panther, bank computer technology is the cause, the determinant., the
limiting condition, while everything else is a dependent variable. Legal rules and human
conduct which conform to those rules are regarded as an effect. Technology determines
the legal rules. Technology determines the limits and parameters of the law. The UCC,
therefore, is applied in a manner which is determined by the needs of the computer. In
order to preserve their legal rights, customers must. change their conduct to meet the
demands of the computer.
The Poullier court's attitude intimates "technological determinism, - and "arnonoru-
OUIS technology, - " the views that society has a limited ability to influence how technology
will affect our lives, and that humans should be passive, adapting their behavior to the
inevitable demands made by the computers. The Poullier court seemed to believe it was
forced into this posture since the bank reasonably found it necessary to computerize its
stop payment system because of its many branch offices."
ThePoulher decision is a classic example of a court's complete abdication of its role, of
an unwarranted willingness to surrender - the rule of law to the demands of primitive
technology. The court never considered the language of the UCC or the rationale for the
rights conferred by it. It should have noted that according to the UCC, the customer is
granted a legal right to stop payment as long as he provides the bank with a "reasonable
opport unity -
 to do so." The Code does not require absolute precision. Under t he logic of
Poullier, however, the bank can dictate the meaning of "reasonable opportunity - by
switching to forms of technology which enable it to contend that what constituted a
reasonable opportunity one day is no longer sufficient the next day. Given this approach,
the bank can substantially erode t he customer's legal right by using computers rather than
people. In stn, the Pallier court erred by ignoring the nature of a check under the UCC,
i.e., a check is merely a customer instruction «.) pay that is fully revocable until the hank
. pays the check.'" The decision also ignores the statement in the Official Comment that
stop payment is a service banks should be required to provide.'"
The one possibly saving feature of the Nuttier opinion is the court's acknowledge-
ment that the hank informed the customer that she must report the "exact dollar amount
of the check" in order to stop payment."'" As will be discussed below' 03 other courts have
required banks to inform the customer of the need for precision as a condition to its
relying on a trivial customer error in escaping liability. Although there are problems with
this approach, it is preferable to penalizing customers 'Or their lack of precision when the
hank did not tell the customer that exactitude was required. It is not clear, however,
whether the hank's disclosure was crucial to the Poullier court's decision. The court may
have reached the same result even absent ;my explicit disclosure of the need for exac-
titude.
97 See P(Pra notes 16-20;tad accompanying text.
" 108 Misc. 2d at 914, 439 N.Y.S.2c1 at 86.
U.C.C.	 4-403(1) (1978).
""' See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
"" U.C.C. § 4-403 official comment 2 (1978).
1 " 108 Misc. 2d at 913. 439 N.V.S.2d at 86 (emphasis in original).
101
 Sep iufro notes 117
-43 and accompanying text.
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At least one court, in dicta, has rejected the view that UC:C section 9-403 requires the
precision demanded by the computer and consequently by Poullier. In Capital Bank a.
Schuler,'" the court noted that the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC had rejected
proposals by California and the District. of Columbia that would have required preci-
sion.'" According to the Schuler court, in light of this rejection,
[lit is apparent, then, that the policy of the Code is not that the check be
specifically described or described with certainty, but only t hat the description
be such as to afford the banks a reasonable opportunity to act on it. In this
respect, the Code effected no significant change in the existing common law
respecting stop-payment orders,'under which the duty of the customer was to
describe the item with 'reasonable accuracy.'
Nevertheless, six states and the District of Columbia have adopted a nonuniform
amendment requiring greater accuracy than the official UCC version.'" In these jurisdic-
tions, requiring customer precision as to the amount of the check is a simple matter of
applying the standards set forth in the statute. One might. question the wisdom of
requiring precision, of refusing to defer to the Permanent Editorial Board, and of
insisting upon a nonuniform provision in a Code whose primary objective is enactment of
a uniform national body of state law" One cannot, however, accuse the courts in these
jurisdictions of ignoring or distorting the law in order to allow computer technology to
dictate the effect given to the law. Nevertheless, cases in the jurisdictions adopting
precision requirements have not been able to apply that standard easily. Those cases,
therefore, provide further illustrations of judicial treatment of the relationship between
law and bank computer technology.
In Capital Bank v. Schuler, m for example, a question of statutory interpretation arose
because the Florida law, while containing a nonuniform clause requiring a customer to
describe the check "with certainty," retained the "reasonable opportunity" language
found in the official version of the UCC."" The court rejected an argument that the
inclusion of a "reasonable opportunity" test modified and diluted the "certainty - re-
quirement."' The Capital Batik court concluded that even if the certainty standard really
104 421 So. al 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
1 ° 5 Id. at 635. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL, BOARD FOR THE. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT
ON VARIATIONS TO CODF. IN ADOPTING STATES 88 (Report No. 2, 1965) [hereinafter cited as P.E.B. FOR
U.C.C.]. In rejecting the proposed amendment the P.E.B. stated: "This entire section [§ 4-4031 in its
1958 form was one of the most extensively debated and carefully considered in the entire Code. It
represents fixed policy. it is considered sound by the sponsoring organizations and the Editorial
Board." Id.
'"" 421 So. 2d at 635.
107 P.E.B. FOR U.C.C., Min/ note 106, at 88 n.4. As stated at footnote 4 to the Board report:
Forty-four states and the Virgin Islands have adopted Section 4-403 U.C.C. (1978) as
written. In addition to Florida, four states (Arizona, California, Nevada and Texas)
require that the check be described with "certainty," See respectively, Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Attn. § 44-2629 (1967); Cal. Cont. Code § 4403 (West 1964); Nev. Rev. Stat.. § 104.4403
(1979); Tex. Bus. & Corn. Code Ann. § 4-403 (Vernon 1968). Utah and the District of
Columbia require that the check be "specifically" described. Utah Code Ann. § 28:4-403
(Stipp. VI1 1980).
109 U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1978).
105 921 So. 2d 633 (Fla. App. 1982).
10 Id. at 635 & n.3; see FLA. STAT. § 674.403(1) (1977).
"' See 421 So. 2d at 635-37.
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did not require absolute precision, the customer's failure to correctly report the check
amount resulted in the hank not being afforded a reasonable opportunity to stop pay-
men - . 112t	 In explaining this conclusion, t he court merely noted that t he bank had adopted
a reasonable computer system, the system required accuracy, and because the customer
had not been accurate, the bank (meaning the bank's computer) hail no reasonable
opportunity (meaning no electronic capability) to act on the stop order.'" The court
justified its result by opining t hat this technology "is designed to provide the most efficient
service to t he greatest number of customers at the least cost. -114
In Capital Bonk, as in Poullier, UCC standards were willingly bent to aCCOIDIDOCIale to
t he needs of the computer. The Capital Bank court failed even to mention whether the
bank informed the customer of the need for precision or whether the customer was
otherwise aware of this need.'" Consequently, the court in Capital Bank took even less
cognizance of t he customer than did the court in Poullier.""
D. Courts "{Taring a Bank to Disclose Its Need for Precision
Some courts in jurisdictions having the official version of section 4-403 allow t he bank
to impose a requirement of precision if the bank has disclosed to the customer that
absolute accuracy is necessary for it to stop payment.' Although these courts treat the
disclosure issue as an isolated one, it can be better analyzed if viewed within the context of
the legal relationship between the customer and the bank. The customer with a checking
account has a contractual relationship with the batik; 119 in that relationship, the rights and
duties imposed on each party depend upon what "expectations were reasonably induced"
by the parties' oral and written statements, their conduct and other circumstances sur-
rounding t heir relationship.'" Unless the bank has expressly informed the customer at a
meaningful time of a requirement to report the amount of the check precisely in order to
stop payment, a court. applying a contractual approach would most likely find that
supplying accurate information except for a minor error as to amount constituted the
" 2
 1d. at 637.
113
114 Id
111 Even if the language in the nonuniform provisions is not susceptible to varying interpreta-
tions, a bank may not be able to take advantage of a state's nonuniform precision requirements
because of its conduct. See, e.g., Rirnherg v. Union Trust, 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGOAN) (D.C.
Super. 1973). The case of Rimherg v. Union Trust was decided in ajurisdiction whose statute required
the customer to "specifically" describe the check. Id. at 528; see D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:4-403 (1981).
The customer's wife told the bank that her husband was out of town and she was not certain whether
he had made out the check in question for $235 or $250. 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 527 (Callaghan) at
528. The teller told her to fill out a form, but never explained the need for precision. M. The wife
wrongly guessed the amount of $235. id. The court held that by failing to explain the need for
absolute accuracy, and giving her just one stop order form to complete, the hank led her to believe
precision was not required. a at 530. By acting in this manner, the court found the bank had waived
the statute's requirement of precision. Id.
"" Compare Capital, 421 So. 2d at 633, with Panther, 108 Misc.2d 913, 439 N.Y.S.2d 85,
1 " See, e.g., Delano v. Putnam Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN') 635 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1981); US Electronics, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CAttAnuAN) 1462, 1467 (Pa.
Ct. Common Pleas 1980).
118 Symons, The Bank-Customer Relation: Part I —The Relevance of Contract Doctrine, IOU BANKING
L.J. 220, 222 (1983).
119 Id. at 223.
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submission of adequate MIM/1;16ml to the bank. A customer would reasonably expect
that the information provided was sufficient and that such an error would not preclude
the hank from being able to stop payment.
Some cases are consistent with this approach." 0 These cases allow the bank to require
precision, but only if the hank describes the need for such accuracy.'"' in effect, these
cases require the bank to make the precise reporting requirement an explicit contractual
term. Moreover, the disclosure required by the court can be quite elaborate. While one
court has merely declared the bank had the duty to inform the customer of the need fin-
precision, 122 another court has found that this was not enough. 12" In the latter case, the
bank told the customer "every bit of information must be accurate. -124 nonetheless, the
court found this warning to he insufficient, pointing out that the hank did not inform the
customer of the procedure by which the computer segregated checks the customer
wanted to stop.'"The court required the bank to "emphasize to [the customer) t hat all .
information [relating to the check] may well he ineffective unless the amount of . the check
were absolutely accurate."'"
The extent to which hanks may contractually modify the rights established for
customers under the UCC is open to question. 127 Even if hanks have this power, courts
insisting on disclosure should not merely require the bank to inform the customer of the
need to be precise. Unless the customer realizes why he must be precise, the significance
of the hank's disclosure will be lost on hint, especially if he knows he has accurately
reported a plethora ()I' information itt addition to reporting the check amount.
A court's inquiry, however, should not end with a determination of whether or not
the bank has described its computer's operation so that the customer realizes why the
bank needs the exact amount of the check. Instead, in order to determine whether the
bank's disclosure should be considered part of the agreement between the parties, the
court should also consider the manner in which the requirement was disclosed to the
customer. One factor to he examined is the timing of the disclosure. Informing the
customer only at the time he submits the stop order may not be fair. 11 the customer did
not know of the requirement when he made out the check, he might not have realized the
importance of recording the exact amount to the penny in his checkbook. The bank
should therefore notify the customer at an earlier time as well. For instance, the stop
payment requirements could be included in documents which are given to the customer
when the account is opened. Disclosure at the time the account is opened, will not be
adequate, however, if presented in a manner in which t he customer could not be expected
to realize the nature and significance of' the requirement. Given the format of many
present bank disclosures — tiny print and legalese 128 courts should also examine bank
120 Delano v. Putnam Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 635 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981);
FJS Electronics, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1462 (Pa. Ct. Common
Pleas 1980).
[21 Id.
122
	 v. Putnam Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 635, 639 (Conn. Super. CI.
1981).
129
	 Electronics, inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1462, 1467 (Pa. Ct.
Common Pleas 1980), nip on other grounds, 288 Pa. Super. 138, 431 A.2d 326 (1981).
124 Id at 1464.
1" Id. at 1467.
1" Id. (emphasis in original).
127 B. CLARE, supra note 70, at 2-41-2-43; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, .supra MAC 80, at 653-55.
1 " See Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California, A Suggested Redefinition and Rs Application to Banking,
Lot. L.A.L. REv. 297, 323-33 (1978).
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forms to ascertain whether they constitute reasonable notice and should be considered
part of the agreement of the parties.
One case implicitly rejects the view that the bank can contract its way out of the UCC's
reasonable opportunity -
 standard and into a standard of absolute accuracy. In EIS
Electronics v. Fidelity Beak, 12" the lower court held that a bank was subject to liability
because it failed to disclose explicitly that. the bank needed precision since it used
computers which required exact numbers."' On appeal, the state superior court also
found the bank subject to liability, but offered no escape through disclosure." Instead,
the opinion emphasized Continent Twos focus on the customer's expectations."' The
court reasoned that a customer would expect the bank to stop a check aber he gives
reasonable notice.'" Au analysis of the notice given by the customer in bp, which
included a fifty cent erro•,•led the court to conclude that it gave the bank a "reasonable
opportunity ' ' to stop payment as t hat standard had been applied in other cases.' Accord-
ingly, the decision in FJS represents a rejection of the bank's "autonomous technology"
argument. The bank had maintained that since its cornputet- needed accurate informa-
tion, the only customer notice which could be legally sufficient is the notice the computer
required. 135
 The court rejected this argument because it was inconsistent with Comment
Two.
Courts adopting the bank disclosure approach are somewhat consistent wit h those
who adhere to the Customer Oriented model. 136 Apparently, they believe that private
enterprise should implement technology in a manner that is intelligible to ordinary
citizens. Requiring t he bank to explicitly disclose its reporting requirements at a meaning-
ful time and in a reasonable manner helps to insure that customers are aware of the way
technology is being used and of how they must modify their behavior in light of that
technology. The bank disclosure approach is not entirely consistent with the customer-
oriented model, however, because it is not necessarily responsive to customers' needs. The
bank disclosure cases represent the position, in effect, that. it is acceptable lO• the bank to
erode the customer's right to stop payment in computerized transactions by requiring
more of hint titan is otherwise required under the UCC, provided the bank informs the
customer that it is going to erode these rights in the interest of accommodating technol-
ogy's demands."'
The appellate court in FJS refused to adopt this approach. Instead, i he court insisted
upon paying attention to the customer's reasonable conduct and expectations.'" In this
respect, the FJS court is more in line with the customer-oriented inoclel which favors
technology which is responsive to people's needs. The FJS court refused to regard
125 28 U.C.C. REP. SE:RV. (CALLAGFIAN) 1462.
'3° Id. at 1467.
"1
 FJS Electronics, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 288 Pa. Super. 138, 141-42, 431 A.2d 326, 327-28
(1981 1•
132 Id. at 142, 431 A.2d at 328. For an excerpt from comment two see swina note 68 and
accompanying text.
03 a
134 id,
135
136 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
137 See FJS Electronics, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1462, 1467 (Pa.
Ct. Common Pleas 1980).
FJS Electronics, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 288 Pa. Super. 138, 142, 431 A.2d 326, 328 (1981).
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technology as an independent variable, as the determinant of our laws and behavior.'"
Rather. it adopted the same standards that the UCC and case law established before the
advent of computerization.'" Consequently, what was reasonable customer conduct be-
fore computerization is still reasonable under the OS approach. If banks wish to take
advantage of the benefits of technology, they must accept the losses which occur as a result
of technology's limitations. As the bp court stated:
[The bank] made a choice when it elected to employ a technique which
searched for stopped checks by amount alone. It evidently found benefits to
this technique which outweighed the risk that an item might be inaccurately
described in a stop order. This is precisely the type of inevitable loss which
was cinitemplatecl by the code drafters and aildressecl by [Comment Two]. 141
The court treated the customer's UCC rights and reasonable customer conduct as the
independent variables,'' If the hank wanted to avoid loss, therefore, it would be required
by the coon to use technology which could process stop payment orders consistent with
these independent variables.'"
E. Stop Payment Under the Uniform New Payments Code
In 1977, the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code estab-
lished a committee to consider whether Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC should include
electronic transfers. Beginning in 1978 the committee prepared numerous drafts of a
payments code known as the Uniform New Payments Code (UNPC). The UNPC pur-
ports to provide a legal framework which, to the extent possible, would attach the same
legal consequences to all types of transfers, whether they are based on a paper, card or
electronic system,'" Discussion of t he UNPC in t his article focuses on P.E.B. Draft No. 3,
the version which was submitted to the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Law for a partial first reading in July of 1983. 1 ' Alt hough many significant
changes may be made in the UNPC before an Official Drab is issued,'" in its present form
it provides material for a fruitful discussion of the relationship between technology,
banking and the law.
The stop payment provisions of the proposed Uniform New Payments Code relating
to the information customers must supply to banks generally reflect the position that the
law and customer conduct should be altered in order to accommodate the needs of bank
computers.'" By regarding the technological requirements of computers as the indepen-
dent variable, or the determinant, the UNPC undermines the general thrust of its
14.
190 id .
' 41 Id.
142 Id. at 141-43, 431 A.2(1 at 328 -29.
143 id. at 142, 431 A.2d at 328.
'" Scott, Memorandum on the Uniform New Payments Code, prepared for the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1 (P.E.B. Draft No. 3, June 15, 1983) (unpublished).
142 See id, Before an Official Draft is approved and promulgated it must go through two
complete readings before the National Conference and one reading before the American Law
Institut e. Benliehl, The New PaymenR Code and the Abolition of Holder in Due Count , Status As to Consumer
Checks, 40 W & Lee. L. Rev. 11, 11 - 12 n.13 (1983).
'" Benfield, supra note 145, at 11 - 12.
147 See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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consumer stop payment rules, which is to strengthen the right to stop payment.'" By
requiring unnecessarily stringent reporting rules in all transactions, the UNPC erodes the
stop payment rights of commercial customers as well as consumers. 149
Section 425 of the UNPC tracks the language of the UCC in providing that a stop
payment order be received in a manner which provides the hank a "reasonable opportu-
nity" to act.'''" The stop payment right, however, is substantially undercut by the UNPC's
reporting provision. 151
 The UNPC requires the customer to "at least accurately identify:
-
(a) his account number, (13) the "dollar amount (not cents)" of the check, (c) the payee, (d)
the customer, and (e) the date of the check, within one calendar week.' 52
 The "Purposes"
section makes clear that these requirements were based on the drafters' perception of
what hank technology needed. 15" That section lists the four items of information in
discussing the "infOrmation which is likely to be possessed by the drawer and which would
he adequate for the payor account institution to identify the order on an automated
basis. . . . -1 " As we have seen, however, bank technology does not employ all of this data
to pull the check out of the automated processing system. 155
 No substantiation is provided
in the cases or UN PC to support the position that banks need, or would even use all the
information a customer is required to provide in order to segregate and identify the check
under the UNPC.'''" Typically, the only information the computer uses is the account
number and the amount of the check.''' The UNPC recognizes this in justifying the
requirement that the customer furnish the exact dollar amount.'" The UNPC does not
explain why the other information is required, and does not obligate the bank to use the
other information in finding the check. Accordingly it would be particularly unfair if a
bank could raise in defense to an action for failure to honor a stop payment order the fact
that the customer had failed to provide the date of the check, when the bank did not need
or use that information. Nevertheless, by characterizing the four items as "formal requis-
ites-159
 of a direction to stop payment, the UNPC seems to sanction this unjust defense.
It is difficult to understand why the UNPC deems this detailed information a "formal
requisite." Under the UCC, the customer must supply only that information which
provides the bank a "reasonable opportunity-
 to stop payment.'" Some courts hold that
the bank and ens' onier can by agreement provide for niore detailed information."" 01 her
'" See U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 425(2) purpose no, 3. U.N.P.C. section 425 expands the law
beycmd its current limits to provide a stop payment right when the customer pays by electronic
means. Id, purpose no. 3.
149 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
1 " U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 425(1).
" 1
 Id. at § 425(9).
152 Id.
Id. at § 425 purpose no. 9.
154 Id.
' 55 See supra nose 78 and accompanying text,
The "purposes-
 part of § 425 merely asserts that the required information "would be
adequate 1Or the payee account institution to identify the order on an automated basis...."
U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 425 purpose no. 9.
sr See calm? note 83 and accompanying text.
supra note 5 at § 425(9)(I>).
1:-u
16" See U.C.C. § 4-403 (1978).
' 6 ' See Delano v, Putnam Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. REP. Sioev. (Cro.LAGHAN) 635, 639 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1981); FJS Electronics, Inc, v. Fidelity Bank, 28 U.C.C. REP. Surly. (CALLAGHAN) 1462, 1467 (Pa.
Ct. Common Pleas 1980).
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courts will not even allow this infringement on the slop payment right.'" Curiously, the
UNPC takes these voluntary private agreements and transforms them into statutorily
required preconditions, regardless of whether bank technology demands them.'" Thus,
in an ironic twist, while bank technology has reduced the amount. of information required
of the customer, the UNPC has unexplainably increased the amount required and
correspondingly increased the extent to which the customer must be accurate.'" While
case law tinder the UCC allows for a flexible approach which some courts employ to
consider both t he reasonable conduct of the customer and the need to accommodate to
the needs of technology, the UNPC takes from the customer and gives to technology even
more than the technology requires. The UNPC's rigid requirements allow no room for
the possibility that technological advances will reduce even further the amount of infor-
mation needed by the batik.
The UN PC further adds insult to injury by not requiring any disclosure of these new
requirements to customers.'" This is contrary to the concept of a coin Factual relationship
between the parties.'" In addition, under UCC case law, banks must disclose specific
reporting requirements to customers. The UN PC, cub silentio, statutorily incorporates its
"formal requisites" into t he agreement of the parties. if this is clone at all, it should be
enforceable only after notice to the customer. Hopefully, banks will supply forms which
list the four types of inlOrmation and which clearly notify the customer that precisely
accurate completion of t he form is required. This can only be a hope, however, because
the UN PC is silent on disclosure requirements by banks. Even if banks supply such forms,
the forms will not assist customers who orally transmit stop payment instructions.' 67
Those customer's will have to rely on batik employees to explain what information is
required.
In most respects the UNPC regards technology as an independent variable.'" Act tr-
ally, t he UN PC is an extreme example of ibis view of technology's role in society because
instead of carefully assessing what technology actually needs, it attempts to anticipate
every bit of information technology might possibly use. As a result customer conduct is
dictated by technology. Acknowledgement of human realities appears only when the
UNPC recognizes that a customer will not be able to report t he exact dollar amount if it is
not accurately recorded in the customer's records.'" This unfortunate occurrence is
characterized as an "inconvenience" which "is offset by the general cost saving to the
system.""° Of course, the absence of a precisely accurate recorded amount is more than
an "inconvenience"; it results in loss of the stop payment right."' In acdition, failure to
keep accurate records of the other required information results in loss of t he right.'"
1" 11S Electronics, Inc- v. Fidelity Bank, 288 Pa. Super. 138, 140-42, 431 A.241 326, 327-28
(1981).
U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 425(9) purpose no. 9.
1 "" ,See id. at § 425. U.N.P.C. § 425 requires no disclosure of the information the customer must
provide. Id.
1 " See generally Symons, supra note 118.
1 " The UN PC allows oral as well as written stop orders. U,N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 425(1).
1" See supra note 1434 and accompanying text.
U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 425 purpose no. 9.
'° a
1 " See id. at § 425. U.N.P.C. section 425 purpose number 9 makes it clear t hat precisely recorded
information is a formal requisite. Id.
12 Id. at § 425 purpose no. 9.
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The UNPC's comment ary describes the competing interests as being the need of
customers to improve their bargaining position' and the need of banks to have sufficient
information for their efficient automated and electronic equipment." 4 This statement of
the issue substantially narrows the customers' held of interest front that which presently
exists under the UCC. Under t he UCC the right to stop payment is not conferred merely
to protect bargaining positions, but also because it is consistent both with the concept that
it check is merely a freely revocable instruction to pay, and with the policy decision that
customers correctly expect banks to provide this service despite occasional losses and
inconvenience In the bank.' m In the name of technology's needs, the UNI'C narrows the
framework for viewing t he right to stop payment and shifts the burden of inconvenience
to the customer,'
In one respect the UNI'C does somewhat restrict technology. Under the UN PC the
customer is required to report only the exact dollar amount of it check.'" The Code itself
specifically does not require die exact amount of cents.'" Consciously or not, this repre-
sents a partial compromise of the UN PC's otherwise "autonomous technology - approach,
because the UNPC denies freedom from liability to financial institutions which utilize
computers so primitive they need t he amount accurate to the penny. The next section of
this article examines a case which imposed even higher standards on the capacity of the
banks' computers. That case raises t he question whether the UNI'C should require banks
to use "state of the art" technology to escape liability. In its present form, except 10F the
cicAlar amount compromise, the UNI'C allows the bank to use whatever technology it
wishes, no matter how archaic.'"
1'. Requiring Banks to Maintain "State of the Art" Technology
One case has adopted the "Systems" model's approach to technology.'" In Migderi v.
Chase Manhattan Bank.' t he court refused to tic customers' rights to whatever technology
t he bank had implemented.") At the same time, the court did not entirely subordinate t he
role of technology in shaping legal rules to govern customer conduct.'" Instead, the court
insisted that if a bank employs technology, it must at least be at a level consistent with the
state of the art."'"
The cases considered thus far apparently involved equipment which required precise
information.'"' The more advanced systems are able to operate even if the customer
reports erroneous information. For example, the Mid,gen case involved a stop payment
order which was submitted to the bank in 1979. At that time, the Chase Manhattan's
computers could segregate a check as long as the reporting error was no more than
'" Id. at § 425 purpose no. 9.
"4 Id,
"h See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
1 " See ,cupra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
17-7 U.N.I'.C., supra note 5. at § 425(9)(b).
1 " Id.
179
'" See .supra text following note 52.
' 8 ' 32 U.C.C. Rge. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 937 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981).
1" Id, at 940.
183 id .
184 Id.
185 See supra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
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one-tenth of one percent of the amount of the check or $1.00, whichever was greater.' 86
At trial, one of the bank's officers testified that in 1981 the bank's computers were able to
tolerate an even greater margin of error, including the two-thirds of one percent error
involved in this case."47 The court found that the bank was negligent in not using
computers which were able to accommodate an error as minor as the customer's, absent
proof' that "the state of the art at the time would render the [hank] unable, employing
reasonable business practices, to stop payment with an error of less than one per-
cent. . .
The Midget) court, in effect, said that if a bank uses computers, it must continually
upgrade them so they have state of the art capabilit ies. 189 01 herwise, the court stated, t he
bank will be considered negligent for failure to stop payment when the customer has
provided information that would have been sufficient for a hank using a state of the art
computer system to effectuate stop payment."'" Moreover, in connection with this state of
the art standard, the court employed a presumption that using a computer which could
not deal with an error of less than one percent was negligent.'" Once the customer shows
that his error was within the one percent range, the court shifted the burden to the bank
to prove that the state of the art was such that, employing reasonable business practices,
the bank would not have been able to program its computer to enable the hank to stop
payment.'"
The court's test in Midgen imposes an onerous burden of proof upon banks. Banks
seeking to avoid liability for failure to stop payment will have to present evidence of the
state of the art at the time of the customer's order. if the hank recently has upgraded its
equipment so that currently it would he able to handle the customer's error, the bank will
have to prove it acted in a commercially reasonable manner by not having computer
equipment with such capacities at the time of the customer's order.
The Midgen court's standard also imposes economic burdens upon financial institu-
tions. Banks use computers to process checks because it is more efficient than other
methods. The cost of having to purchase new equipment in order to maintain state of the
art capability for stop payment. orders, however, may significantly reduce the cost savings
which resulted front using computers. Consequently, banks with less capital available for
such purchases would not be as able to comply with this standard. They would be at a
competitive disadvantage to banks with plenty of capital to invest in the necessary equip-
ment.
The court's approach in Midgen also implicitly embodies a philosophy which prom-
otes technological advancement and is consistent with the Systems model. If banks are
required to continue buying the latest in computer equipment in order to avoid liability,
those designing and producing such equipment have a captive market for their goods.
Because of this market, there is a built-in incentive for them to continue to improve their
"" 32 U.C.C. REP. SEkV. (CALLAGHAN-) at 938-39.
'" Id. at 939.
'" Id. at 940. Although neither side presented evidence of industry practice in 1979, the court
apparently had misgivings about the bank's willingness to keep current with the state of the a rt . See id.
This was apparent from the fact that in 1981 the state of the art and reasonable business practices
resulted in the bank using computers which had the capacity to handle an error such as the one
involved in the case before it. See id.
"9 Id.
190
191 M
192 id.
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equipment • The state of the art test could result not only in the use of more sophisticated
computers, but. also in' even greater dependence on computers.
From t he customer's perspective, however, the court's test in Midgen is justifiable. if a
customer must change his conduct to meet the computer's needs, at least he should have
the benefit of computers which meet current technological standards. Otherwise, the
customer may find his ability' to exercise legal rights has been substantially undermined
because his bank uses primitive equipment instead of manual procedures or the more
sophisticated machinery available.
Midget's state of the art standard also appears consistent with the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. The UCC gives the customer the right to stop payment, but only if the
customer acts befOre his bank pays the check.'" Computerization of check processing
substantially shortens the time available to the customer, thereby considerably weakening
the customer's right.' 94 Because the bank can use computers which undermine this right
by reducing the time available, t he UCC should he interpreted to require the bank to use
computers which facilit a te the bank's ability to execute the stop order when the customer
does act within the computer-determined time frame.
In addition to being consistent with t he Systems model, the Midgen court's approach
is in harmony with those who would "humanize" technology rat her than oppose it, glorify
it, or submit to it. Under' Midgen's state of the art standard, technology is welcomed, and it
may be an influence in applying legal rules. Nonetheless, a bank can exploit technology to
a customer's detriment only if the bank employs equipment which is "customer friendly"
when such systems are available.
Midgen also illustrates a weakness in the UN PC provision requiring the customer to
report the exact dollar amount.'" Section 425(9)(b) of the UNPC apparently constitutes a
recognition of current state of the art, including the ability of computers to process stop
payment. orders even if' the customer erroneously, reports the amount of cents in which
the check was issued. The requirement is too rigid, however, and falls short of being a
reasonable accommodation. As Midgen demonstrates, computers can do much better than
the UNPC implies. Computers can tolerate a margin of error tied to the percentage by
which the reported amount varies from the actual amount . 196 Consequently, customers
may make errors in the amount of several dollars and computers can still process stop
payment orders.' 97 Thus, the UNPC insists that customers bend to technological needs,
but then decides for itself' what those needs are without leaving any room for flexibility in
the event technology improves,'" In contrast to Midgen, therefore, the UNPC provides no
built-in incentive for banks to humanize technology.
The preceding discussion of the cases and t he UN PC provides the basis from which
standards for a revised UCC stop payment provision can he formulated. These standards,
discussed in the following section, reasonably accommodate the needs of technology, the
expectations of customers and the commercially reasonable practices of banks. At the
same time, t hey are consistent with the principles underlying the current UCC.
' 93 U.C.C. § 4-'303(1) (1978).
'" U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at purpose no. 2.
195 Id. at § 425(9)(h).
'" Migden v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 32 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 937, 939 (N.Y. Civ, Ct.
1981).
'" See id.
198 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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G. Standards Jot a Revised Stop Payment Provision
The law of stop payment should not be dictated by bank technology, nor should the
law conflict with banks' reasonable use of electronic equipment. Rather, the law should
embody the fundamental principles to which commercial law has always tried to be
faithful, and bank technology should have to find its place in the context of those
principles. Those principles allow customers to take advantage of their rights as long as
they conduct themselves in a reasonable fashion.'" Similarly, banks must behave in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards, using ordinary care.'
The UCC provides the customer with the right to stop payment if his order is
"received at such time and such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to
act on it."'' This provision could be improved upon without reducing flexibility by
providing the customer the right if he supplies the bank with "that information which
would he sufficient for a reasonably prudent banker to act upon if he were using ordinary
care and conducting himself in accordance with commercially reasonable siandards." 2"
To prevent this standard of reasonableness from being merely a "reaffirmation of the
predominant morals of the market place,"'" however low those morals might. be, and to
provide the specificity necessary to prevent judges from interpreting reasonableness in
whatever manner conforms to their individual values, the law also should require the
following. The hank would he liable for paving over a stop order if the customer provided
information which a reasonable customer expects to be sufficient, even if the customer
made minor reporting errors which the bank's computers could not handle. The hank
would not be able to escape liability simply by proving commercial reasonableness
through a showing that it conducted its operations in a manner comparable to other
banks. The hank also would have to demonstrate that a reasonable customer could not
have believed the information he supplied would be adequate.
lithe bank wished to impose reporting requirements more strict than those discussed
above, the burden would be on the hank to prove several things in order successfully to
defend an action brought by a customer. First, the hank would have to show it clearly and
i"	 §§ 3-406, 4-406 ( l) (1978); see infra note 209.
See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-103(1) & 4-406(1), (3) (1978). These principles are embodied in
many sections of the U.C.C. Id. El/r example, a customer cannot hold his bank liable for paying a
check which contains an unauthorized signature if he "by his negligence substantially contributes" to
the making of such a signature.M. at § 3-406. Even if the customer was negligent, however, the bank
which pays the check must have acted in good faith and "in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards" in order to escape liability. Id. When a customer receives his statement of account, he must
"exercise reasonable care and promptness" in examining the statement and the returned checks,
promptly reporting any alterations or unauthorized signatures. N. at § 4-406(1). Even if the cus-
tomer fails to comply with this .standard the hank is liable if it did not exercise "ordinary care" in
paying the check. Id. at § 4-406(3). No agreement between the bank and its customer can "disclaim a
banks responsibilit y for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can limit the
measure of' damages" for failing to meet this standard. Id. at § 4-103(1).
'in Id. at § 4 -403.
2"2 See J. WiturE & R. SUNIMERS„n- upro note 73, at 680. White & Summers recommend the
following: "When the customer gives erroneous inhumation or gives less information than the
banker asks for, we urge courts to review the information given to determine whether a reasonably
prudent banker with that information should have found the check." Id.
Danzig, A Comment on the jori,sprudenee of the UCC, 27 STAN. L. Rev. 62 1, 629 (1975). For a
critique of the UCC's use of the standard of reasonableness, see Mellinkolf, The Lan,L,ruoge of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE .1.J. 185, 209-213 (1967).
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conspicuously disclosed the reporting obligations to the customer at a meaningful time
before the customer exercised the right. In addition, t he disclosure would have to explain
why the bank needs the information required; if for example precision is required, the
need for that precision should be explained. Thus, if the hank needs the exact amount of
the check for its computers, the customer should be told so that he will fully appreciate
that if he is not accurate he will lose his stop payment right.. This explanation would also
fulfill the more general function of providing the customer with information with which
Ire can better appreciate the impact of technology on his life. Next, in order to prevent
banks from unduly undermining the customer's right to stop payment by rigid require-
ments the hank should have the burden of justifying its requirements. For example, if
precision is needed for the hank's technology, the bank should have the burden of
proving its technology is substantially in accordance with the state of the art.
The above standards are consistent with the humanizer's' approach to technology. 204
Through these standards technology is treated as a dependent variable. The legal right to
stop payment is the independent variable. The standards are also customer-oriented in
that if the customer must conform to higher standards of conduct because of electronic
equipment, the reasons are explained to the customer enabling him to understand the
bank's use of technology. Finally, the standards arc consistent with the Systems model as
well because the state of the art requirement insures the development of the best. technol-
ogy available. This should result in technology which ultimately demands less of custom-
ers while increasing bank efficiency and profits.
IV. BANE FAILURE TO TRANSFER FUNDS
A. lalroduction
As demonstrated above, the stop payment cases involve customer error, not com-
puter mall unction:2"r' Despite the fact that the customer is at fault, the allocation of loss
can not simply be put on the customer in every instance. 2" If the hank never discloses the
need for precision or if the bank uses primitive computers, the loss may properly be
placed on the bank. 2°' The cases considered in this section present the situation in which
customers correctly instruct their banks to transfer funds but the batik electronic equip-
ment fails to operate correctly. Superficially, it would appear that the loss should fall on
the bank. The customer did nothing wrong; the bank made a mistake. Case law, existing
statutes and the proposed Uniform New Payments Code, however, severely limit the
bank's liability, saying in effect, that correct customer conduct is not sufficient to protect
the customer from loss.
This section concerns the customer who instructs his bank to transfer his funds
electronically to a person to whom the customer owes a debt. This can occur in a number
of different electronic formats.'" For example, a customer can arrange in advance to
See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
105
	 Poullier v. Nacua Motors, 108 Misc. 2d 913, 913-14, 439 N.Y.S. 2d 85, 86 (N.Y. Sup.
G1.1981); Migden v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 32 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 937, 938 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1981).
21' See supra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
2" FJS Electronics, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1962 (Pa. Ct.
Common Pleas 1980); Migden v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 32 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 937,
938-40 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981).
208 See generally Grandstaff	 Smaistrla, supra note 3.
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have his rent paid electronically. if his bank or someone else along the transfer trail fails
to effecu the transfer, the consumer may face eviction from an angry landlord, particu-
larly if the consumer's account was debited t he amount. of the rent. and he lacks extra
funds to pay the rent a second time while trying to discover and straighten out the
problem and get his account recredited. Many businesses pay their employees by elec-
tronic direct deposit and millions of persons receive government benefits such as Social
Security in this manner. 209 Commercial customers can meet their obligations across the
world by moving t heir funds via wire transfers. 21 " Obviously, severe consequences may
result if these payments are not made. The type of loss which concerns customers most is
not the specific payment which went. astray, but the consequential damages — such as
losses incurred by being evicted because of the bank's failure to transfer the rent — which
may result.
No data has been gathered documenting the extent to which banks fail to make
transfers as instructed by their customers. One expert believes the incidence may vary
depending upon the cause for the failure. 2 " Sonic failures, for example, occur as a result
of criminals diverting the funds into their own secret accounts:2 ' 2 Such failures may not be
detected for some time and may be difficult to prevent, because according to one
commentator:
The nature of EFT systems precludes some of the most effective protection
from major, sophisticated attacks that are inherent in previous systems....
EFT computer systems including up to six million instructions in the operat-
ing programs and several hundred thousand instructions in the application
programs are unpredictable and not subject to practical integrity testing over
practical periods of time."'
Intentional actions by criminals shoukl he distinguished from accidents due to
human or computer error. If the error involves a large amount, or results its a customer
complaint, the bank should be able to locate the error and stop it from recurring. Even
when each failure is small, if the error continuously repeats itself, large losses will result
and these losses should be noticed and siopped. 2 " As one expert has stated:
The problems of errors and omissions have been well-known and evolve
along with the use of advancing technology. There are essentially no unsolved
technical problems associated with control of accidents. Control consists of
cost-beneficial application of known remedies. However, it must be
realized that the greatest and often unseen dangers of accidents are their
unpredictability because of the complexity of computer systems.... Fortu-
nately, if safeguards are designed and implemented to defend against inten-
tional acts, t hey also defend against a wide range of accidental acts. 2 ' 5
The law must decide how to allocate loss when an accident occurs. Should the law
establish minimum performance standards? Should liability depend upon whether the
209 Id. at 9-10.
'L° Id. at 7.
2 " Parker, Vulnerabilities of EFT Systems to Intentionally Caused Losses, in COMPUTERS AND BANKING,
supra note 2, at 91, 93.
212 Id .
213 Id. at 99.
2 " N. at 95.
215 Id. at 95-96.
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bank employed sound business procedures arid state of the art technology to prevent a
failure to transfer? In answering these questions, lawmakers should take into account the
extent to which the technological problems are well-known and safeguards are avail-
able.'
The manner in which a judge or drafter of statutes determines how to allocate loss
for failure to transfer funds may depend upon his view of the relationship between
technology, society and the law. In addition, his decision may be influenced by the
framework in which he considers this situation. He may regard EFT as just another
payment. system, the latest in a string of technological developments which merely adds
new leatures. 217
 In that context, a decision on how to allocate loss for failure to transfer is
of no more significance than allocating loss when a check is paid over a forged signature.
Alternatively, the lawmaker may regard EFT as a comprehensive financial transactions
system 218
 comprised of two elements: (I) delivery systems such as computer terminals and
electronic networks; and (2) financial set -vices such as checks, credit cards, debit. cards,
home computer banking, check guarantee and the like. Under this view, EFT is more
than the transfer of funds to pay obligors. It also can he used to transfer money from one
type of customer account to another. It transfers information as well as funds. Conse-
quently, it is more than a payment transfer system.
The most expansive view is the "total systems approach - in which EFT is viewed as
part of a wide range of activities in which technology has systematized services and
interconnected people, businesses, cities and nations. 219
 This comprehensive systematiza-
tion has occurred in communications, transportation and economic exchange. For exam-
ple, the home computer can he used for banking, shopping, communication, personal
record keeping, education and entertainment. 22" It would he myopic to view banking by
home computer independent of the far more comprehensive system of which it is but one
part.
The lawmaker's conception of EFT may be instrumental in his allocation of loss
because it will influence his choice of points of reference. A lawmaker who regards EFT
narrowly as simply one type of payment system will look to t he legal rules on allocation of
loss for other payment devices such as checks. The lawmaker who considers EFT as a
comprehensive financial transactions system will be concerned with the implications of his
decision for the entire complex of banking transactions and the effect of his allocation
upon customer expectations. bank operating procedures, bank-customer relations, and
the application of technology in harking. The lawmaker who regards EFT as an integral
part of a comprehensive technological system will have an even broader range of con-
cerns. If a case involves banking by home computer, a judge using t his third approach will
consider not only how his decision might influence transfer of funds by computer in
particular, and computer banking service in general, but also how his decision relates to
the larger universe of telecommunications and computer systems.
Recent legal developments provide a specific context in which to explore the issues
which arise when a bank fails to transfer funds as instructed by the CUSiOnler. The article
will now examine a few of those developments. The case of Earn v. Swiss Bank resulted in
216
 Id.
11' See generally Kraemer & Colton, supra note 16.
2111 Id. at 248.
219 Id.
225 Adams, Home Banking Interchange Offers More Than Just Credits and Debits, AM. BANKER, July 6,
1983, at 8, col. 3.
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two clecisions 221
 which illustrate very different approaches to the relationship between law
and technology. The opinions provide an opportunity to evaluate the impact of a legal
standard upon the rights and liabilities of customers and banks when unreliable technol-
ogy is used to transfer payments. In addition to the Evra case, the article also discusses
how the UN PC allocates loss when the bank makes an erroneous transfer and calls upon
the drafters of the UN PC to describe explicitly the nature of the relationship between law
and technology which the UNPC seeks to effectuate.
B. The Evra eases: A Pandora's Box
This article's examination of the bank's failure to transfer funds centers on the
district and circuit court decisions in Evra v. Swiss Bank. 222 The Swiss Bank case is one of the
few reported cases involving electronic transfers and it has been relied upon to support
two provisions of the UNPC. 223
 More important for purposes of this article, the two
opinions illustrate starkly the contrasting approaches to the relationship between technol-
ogy, society and the law.
1. The Facts
Evra was an Illinois corporation in the business of oceanic freight shipping and the
sale of scrap metals at home and abroad. Evra chartered t he ship Pandora to transport
scrap metal. 224 Payments were due in advance and were to be paid into the ship owner's
Geneva bank account. 225
 Evra made some payments by wire transfer and some by check.
The October 1972 payment was made by check, but arrived after the due date. As a
result, the owner sought to withdraw the charter.'" Pursuant to a provision in the charter,
an arbitration panel was established. They ruled that the charter could not be withdrawn,
but that t he payment provision of the charter would be "strictly enforced... 227 Evra made
the remaining payments by wire transfer. All went well until the payment which was due
at 9:00 P.M. Geneva time on April 27, 1973.
On April 25 at about 9:17 A.M. Chicago time, Evra instructed Continental Bank to
transfer funds by wire to the owner. 22" This transfer was attempted by sending a telex
message to Continental's London branch which then tried to notify Swiss Bank, it.s Geneva
correspondent bank. 229 Swiss Bank never acted on the message: it never transferred
money into the owner's account at Banque de Paris in Geneva. L3" As a result, on April 27,
the owner cancelled the charter.'" Upon receiving notice of cancellation, Evra immedi-
ately called Continental and instructed it to tell Swiss Bank to transfer t he money to the
owner anyway. 2 "2 Evra also called the owner, informing him the payment had been
32 ' 522 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. III. 1981), rev'd., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
222 See infra notes 248 -308 and accompanying text.
222
	 supra note 5, at § 101 purpose no. 2, § 411 purpose no. 8.
224 522 F. Supp. at 823. At the time the contracts were entered into, Evra Corporation was
known as Hyman-Michaels Company. Id. at 822.
225 Id. at 823.
226 Id. at 824.
2" Id.
2" Id.
229
	 at 823.
33° Id. al 825.
231 Id.
232 id.
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inade."" The owner refused to change his mind and told Evra "that all further attempts to
effect payment would be rejected." 234 The owner had every reason to stand his ground.
Since the ves sel had been chartered to Evra, charter rates had skyrocketed. Once the
charter was withdrawn the owner was now able to charter the boat to someone else at a
much higher price.'
Evra sued Swiss Bank in contract and tort, claiming consequential damages. 2"" Al-
though it is unclear why Swiss Bank failed to transfer the funds, the district court was
convinced that the problem centered on the telex machine at Swiss Bank which had
received the message."' The court found that the bank either lost the message or
neglected to have its machine supplied with paper which would have produced a copy of
t he message.'"
The court's finding indicated that Swiss Batik's failure to act On the message resulted
from a combination of a lack of sound procedures Fur handling telex inessages, 2 " 9
inadequate techm.ilogy,240 and
 perhaps careless employee conduct."' The bank's practices
represented everything people adhering to the Systems model abhor. The technological
system was primitive and unreliable. The telex machine would continue to receive mes-
sages and would communicate receipt of the message to the receiver even when the
machine had rim out of paper. 242 Consequently, no written record would he made."' In
addition, the machine was not equipped to make duplicate copies of messages when paper
was in 'lie machine."' As a result, if a person took the single copy of the message and then
lost, misfiled or destroyed it, there was no backup copy. 245 In addition to these technolog-
ical inadequacies, t he bank had no system for logging messages or ensuring that they were
acted upon, and no one in charge of checking the machines for paper. 24" This failure of
people, procedures and machine was compounded by the "answer-back" feature on the
telex which automatically told the sender that the message had been received, implying
that everything was working satisfactorily."'
2. The District Court Decision: The Shocking Swiss Rank
A review of the bank's technology and procedUreS 248 led the district court to decide in
favor of Evra on Iwo claims — breach by Swiss Bank of its contractual duty of care and
233 id.
234 id.
2." Id. at 824.
I" Id. at 822.
227 hl. at 825.
238 Id.
2311
240 Id.
241 hi. The fact that the message was lost indicates possible employee negligence.
242 hjr.
243 Id .
244
 Id. at 829.
24S Other telex machines are capable both of automatically shutting off when out of paper, and
producing copies as well as originals. Telephone interview with C.B. Cox, Man fact LI rer's Representa-
tive, Extel Corporation in Altanta, Georgia (August 16, 1983).
"fi Evra, 522 F. Supp. at 825.
247
 Id, at 825, 829.
24' Id. at 829. The district court opinion is referred to subsequently as Evra I.
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negligence. 249 The court summed up its finding by stating: "Such a cavalier attitude
toward major transactions by a sophisticated international bank is shocking to the
court." 2" The court rejected the bank's counter-claim alleging that Evra had assumed the
risk and had been contributorily negligent."' Defendants had argued that Evra should
have allowed more than three clays lead time fOr the transfer since Evra knew late
payment would result in withdrawal of the charter and knew of the possibility of errors
and delays. 252 The court found that since "telex communication is essentially instantane-
ous," a three day lead time was not negligent. 2" Moreover, the court found, the bank's
procedures were such that a greater lead time might not have made any difference.
According to the court, "[Evra] was entitled to assume that Continental and any corre-
spondent employed by Continental would use clue care in carrying out the transaction.
[Evra] did not employ and was not obligated to employ a confirmation procedure inde-
pendent of any employed by the banks...." 254
The court's approach is consistent with the System model's insistence that. technology
be efficient and reliable. 255 In pointing out the technological infirmities present, the court
implicitly imposed a state of the art requirement. In finding the bank at fault for using
machines that did not automatically shut off when they ran out of paper,'" the court in
effect required the hank to employ machines which contain that feature. The court. also
determined that the bank was negligent in using a machine which could not make copies
of messages."' In effect, therefore, the court's decision required that the hank buy
equipment which does make copies.
The tone of the district court's opinion is also consistent with the humanizer's
approach. The court required the bank to maintain a technological system which is
responsive to the needs and expectations of its users, finding that the bank "owed a duty
of care Do the customer] to maintain a system ... upon which [the customer] could
rely... ." 2" Imposing this obligation was not a reflection of judicial hostility to bank
technology; the court pointed out that it was merely imposing a "minimal" burden by
requiring the bank to use equipment and adopt procedures to prevent substantial injury
which was a "more than reasonably foreseeable possibility." 2" The decision illustrates the
humanizer's perspective by insisting that if a bank uses electronic equipment it must be
able to control that equipment . 2" Because banks are responsible for their equipment, the
court held that customers do not "assume the risk" when they pay their banks to transfer
their money by electronic means."'
The court's approach is also consistent wit h the Statist model. That model adheres to
the view that the government has an interest in maintaining a system upon which users
can rely."' By refusing to find Evra contributorily negligent in not independently
249 Id. at 828-29.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 831-32.
252 Id. at 831.
24.' Id.
251 Id. at 832.
255 See supra text following note 52.
256 Evra 1, 522 F. Supp. at 829.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 831.
262 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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confirming the transfer, the court promoted the development of reliable systems. While
courts should not relieve hank customers of all responsibility to exercise care in transfer-
ring funds, the facts in Swiss Bank show the customer was not negligent in failing to take
the initiative to confirm the transfer. That failure was justified because the bank notified
Evra that it had received the instructions to pay the owner, that it had debited Evra's
account in the amount of the transfer, and that it was proceeding to transfer the money by
wire. If the court had found the customer contributorily negligent under these circum-
stances, it would have provided no incentives for banks to maintain dependable systems.
The real test of the strength of the court's convictions was the measure of damages.
Evra was not only claiming damages of $27,040.62, the amount of the installment
payment which had been debited from its account but never paid to the Pandora's
owner. 263 In addition, Evra claimed consequential damages of over two million dollars. 264
The court held Evra entitled to this additional amount, ruling that although Swiss Bank
was unaware of the specifics of the transaction between Evra and Pandora's owner, it
could "reasonably foresee" failure to act upon a telex message to transfer funds into the
account of another "could result in substantial darnage." 265
This conclusion is not startling. Ordinarily, companies transfer funds to other com-
panies because they owe money to them. Debts are usually payable by a certain date. If
one does not pay by that date, often one suffers harsh penalties — late charges, finance
charges, repossession, eviction, loss of an option to purchase, wit hdrawal of" a charter. 266
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit did not regard such consequences as being the least bit
reasonably foreseeable, and its opinion reflects a very different attitude toward technol-
ogy, people and the law.
3. '['he Circuit. Court Decision: The Imprudent Customer
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the Swiss Bank decision, refusing to award
Evra consequential damages. 267 The circuit court insisted that it did not "condone the
sloppy handling of incoming telex messages" by Swiss Bank, 266
 and acknowledged that.
Swiss Bank knew or should have known the transfer by Evra was to pay for the hire of a
ship. 269
 The judges stressed, however, that Swiss Bank did not know When payment. was
due, or that the owner would cancel for late payment, or that the charter rate was so
favorable that Evra would suffer substantial damages if cancellation occurred."° Whereas
the district court imposed a test of "general" foreseeability, the Seventh Circuit imposed a
test of" "specific" foreseeability. 2" More significant for this discussion, the circuit court
switched the emphasis completely away from Swiss Bank's failure to employ reliable
28.7 Evra I, 522 F. Supp. at 825
- 26.
264 Id. at 835 n.9.
2" Id. at 833.
See generally B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions (1980).
267
 Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F,2d 951, 960 (711i Cir. 1982). The circuit court decision
is referred to subsequently as Evra
2" Id. at 957.
282 Id. at 956.
270 id.
27 ' Id. at 959. The bank would have had specific Forseeability if it knew the following: when
Evra's payment was due, the terms of the charter, and the fact that if payment were to any extent late
the charter would be cancelled. Id. at 956.
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technology and sound business practices, 272 Whereas the district court pointed out that
Swiss Bank is "a sophisticated international bank," 273 the circuit court stated that Evra is a
"sophisticated business enterprise."274 While the district court was "shocked" by Swiss
Bank's breach of the "duty of care," 275 the Seventh Circuit found Evra's conduct "showed
a lack of prudence throughout."'"
The Seventh Circuit's holding was presaged by the manner in which it related the
facts of the case. First, the court set itself within a more comfortable time frame. 277 The
district court had found that the payment was due at 9:00 P.M. Geneva time, April 27,
1973. 278 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that since the installment was due April 27 and
payment was due in advance, the payment "arguably" was due by the close of business on
April 26. 279 Under the circuit court's analysis, therefore, Evra allowed it self only two days
lead time instead of three.
In addition, the circuit court related all of the things which Evra might have done to
prevent any injury which might result from the failure to transfer,'" The opinion
repeatedly pointed out that Evra did not try to wire the payment directly to Banque de
Paris after it was informed by Pandora's owner that payment had never been made by
Swiss Bank."' The decision did not mention that Evra had immediately called the owner
and that he had refused to relent, specifically informing Evra that direct payment would
be refused. 282 The circuit. court instead assumed that the subsequent arbitrators' decision
would have been favorable if Evra had tried to pay directly."' The court seemed to imply
that Evra should have known an attempt at direct payment might favorably impress the
arbitrators. Consequently, the court concluded that Evra was imprudent not to try direct
payment. despite the owner's clear rejection of any late payment."'
The Seventh Circuit sarcastically ridiculed Evra for relying on the integrity of the
electronic banking system. 285 According to the court, Evra "knew or should have known
that even the Swiss are not infallible; that messages sometimes get lost or delayed . . . and
that therefore it should take its own precautions against the consequences — best known
to itself — of a mishap that might not be due to anyone's negligence." 288 In this last
phrase, the court revealed that it was unwilling to analyze the transaction in the context of
what actually occurred. It required the customer to take its own independent precautions
because a failure to transfer might occur without anyone being careless."' It was easier
for the circuit court to place the burden on the customer by discussing the issues in the
' 72 Id. at 957. The court did refer to Swiss Bank's "sloppy handling" in one sentence of the
opinion. Id. The remainder of the decision emphasizes Evra's conduct. Id. at 952 -60.
2" Evra 1, 522 F. Supp. at 829.
Evra II, 673 F.2d at 957.
275 Evra I, 522 F. Supp. at 829.
278 Evra II, 522 F. Supp. at 829.
277 Id. at 953.
278 Evra I, 522 F. Supp. at 324.
279
	 11, 673 F.2d at 953.
280 Id. at 953, 957.
281 Id. at 953, 954, 957.
282 Compare Evra II, 673 F.2d 951 with Evra I, 522 F. Supp. at 825.
283 Evra II, 673 F.2d.at 957.
284 Id.
282
 Id.
286 Id .
297 Id.
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context of a failure to transfer which occurs even though the bank conducted its opera-
tion properly. It is much harder to shift the burden from the bank to the customer within
the reality of what happened in this case:" the customer followed its bank's procedures to
the let.ter while the correspondent hank failed to operate in a commercially reasonable
man ner. 28'
The Seventh Circuit's opinion provides no incentives for banks to develop payment
services consistent with t he Systems, Statist and Customer Oriented models. The court in
effect, held that bank services need not he reliable, that the failure of banks to maintain
reliable payment mechanisms will not result in substantial liability when the system breaks
down.'" Instead, the court found that customers are contributorily negligent if they
assume technological systems will not malfunction, that customers assume the risk of
harm if they use the system, and that customers should know that bank technology may be
dangerous to their economic health.'" This approach provides little encouragement for
the bank to institute a reliable system.
In EznYi II the Seventh Circuit also seems to reject the state's interest in banks
maintaining a functioning national and international payments system.'" Such a system is
necessary for the economic well-being of the nation as a whole, not only the individuals
who use the system. 292 An inefficient. system of transferring funds reduces the efficiency
of commerce. The law can be used as a social force to provide incentives for banks to
deploy reliable technology to help achieve these national objectives.
Those adhering to the Customer Oriented model warn a system which is consistent
with customers' reasonable expectations of reliability. They want technology which is
"humanized," or "user friendly."'" The Seventh Circuit rejected this expectation as
unwarranted and naive.'" Customers should not expect technology to work, the circuit
court intimated, at least not "sophisticated" customers, even when dealing with the Swiss.
In sharp contrast to the Customer Oriented model's consideration of reasonable
customer expectations and reliable bank technology, the circuit court focused on what. it
regarded as required conduct by a prudent customer. In order for Evra's conduct to have
passed muster under the Seventh Circuit's prudence standard, it would have had to
possess knowledge of the exact. level of Swiss Bank's technology and to have planned
accordingly with regard to lead time and monitoring the hank's transfer of funds. The
judges gave no consideration to whether Evra' s expectations were reasonable in relation
to the technological capabilities and management procedures of most hanks. Moreover,
they paid no attention to the state of the art at the time the transaction took place. The
circuit court. asserted t.hat the costs of improper transfer should be borne by the party who
can avert the consequences of such a transfer at least cost.m Instead of determining the
cost to each party of preventing such a transfer, however, the Seventh Circuit assumed
Evra was the party able to avert the consequences of a failed transfer at the least cost, 296
Evra I, 522 F. Supp. at 825.
289
	 Evra II, 67'3 F.2d at 957. The seventh circuit instead requires the customer to take his own
precautions. Id.
290 ld.
" I See id. For a discussion of the model "statist's" viewpoint and values, see supra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text.
29' OTA, supra note 34, at 46, 73-74.
2" See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
294
	 II, 673 F.2d 957.
Evra II, 673 F.2d at 957.
296 Id.
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without ever examining how much it would have cost Swiss Bank to deploy that which
would have prevented the failure from occurring. The approach of the Seventh Circuit
seems to be: you take your bank's technology as you find it.
An alternative approach for allocating the risk of transfers which go astray is to
regard the law and reasonable bank and customer conduct as independent variables.
Under this analysis, bank technology must be consistent wit h the standards set by the law.
The law's allocation of risk should he grounded in a regard for (1) reasonable customer
conduct as measured by realistic expectations and reasonable response to technological
failure; and (2) reasonable bank practices as measured by minimal standards for techno-
logical performance and procedural systems to manage the technology.'"
In Earn v. Swiss Bank, the customer's conduct was reasonable. Evra had no way to
measure the reliability of Swiss Bank's technology. The transaction costs of continuously
monitoring and evaluating the current state of the technology would be too great to
justify placing such a requirement on Evra. Without some way to determine reliability„
Evra could not rationally decide what types of precautions were necessary. It was reason-
able for Evra to believe transfers would he made successfully. No problems had occurred
during the previous sixteen wire transfers it made to Pandora's owner through Continen-
tal and Swiss Bank."38 Moreover, Evra had Continental Batik's assurances that wire
transfers would be timely.'" Continental had made these assurances after one of Evra's
payments by check had arrived past the due date and Evra had stressed to the bank the
need for timely transfer of funds. 3°° While it. is not unreasonable to require the customer
to mitigate his damages once technological failure occurs, the customer in Evra took
immediate, rational action under the circumstances.
The extent of the Seventh Circuit's customer mitigation standard can be better
appreciated by considering the ramifications of the decision's notification requirement.
The circuit court justified its refusal to grant consequential damages on the fact thatEvra
never supplied Swiss Bank with the specific information from which it could foresee the
possibility that failure to transfer would result in consequential damages which so far
exceeded the amount of the transfer. 30 ' Although Evra did not provide Swiss Bank with
"notice of special circumstances," it did provide its own bank, Continental, with that
information. 30 ' Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit ruled, in effect, that communicating
with one's own bank is insufficient. 303 The customer apparently must notify every bank in
the collection chain of the amount of consequential damages which might result in order
to hold any of them liable.
Presumably, even notifying all banks may not be adequate. Implicit in the circuit
court's opinion is the requirement that in addition to notifying every bank, the customer
297 Technological systems such as wire transfers involve four distinct elements, all of which
should operate at a satisfactory level of accuracy. These four elements are: (1) the technological
apparatuses, i.e., the physical devices such as telex machines and computer terminals; (2) the
technique used to operate the system, i.e., the procedure, routines and skills; (3) the social organiza-
tion, i.e., the bureaucracy in which technology occurs; and, (4) the network, i.e., the systems linking
people, organizations and apparatus across substantial distances (e.g., Evra, Continental Bank, Swiss
Bank, Banque de Paris, Pandora's Owner). See L. WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY 1 1-12 (1977).
"" Evra 1, 522 F. Supp. at 823-24.
299
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must engage in sophisticat&I advance planning to anticipate all possible technological
failure. 304
 He must order the transfer far in advance of its due date and must monitor its
transmission from branch to branch, over the oceans, and to other banks, never relying
on his banks' written confirmations to him. 305
 He must maintain funds on hand equal to
twice as much as the transfer, so that if the transfer fails to reach the payee, the customer
can immediately transfer the funds again. 306
 If the customer does not do all of the above,
he will not recover his consequential damages because he has acted imprudently under
t he doctrine of "avoidable consequences."'
Both Evra I (the district court decision) and Evra 11 (the Seventh Circuit decision) can
be faulted for having too narrow a perspective. Earn I considers the transaction largely
from the vantage point of the customer's needs and expectations. The district court. also
should have considered the implications of its ruling within the wider framework of the
international wire transfer system and the needs of all of the parties with an interest in
that system. In particular, the district court should have considered the economic impact
of its ruling. If banks are liable for consequential damages, they might increase sig-
nificantly t he price charged for such transfers. Finally, the court should have explored the
operational consequences of its holding. For example, it is possible that banks would have
to hire substantially more personnel and institute far more comprehensive and complex
procedures to avoid the failed transfers for which they would be liable.
In contrast, Evra Ps sympathies seem to rest exclusively with the bank. It did not look
at the case within the larger context of an international payments system. It did not
explicitly consider the relationship between technology and the law. The Seventh Circuit.
did not explore the possibility of accommodating the legitimate needs and interests of all
groups with a stake in the reliability of the funds transfer system.
Even if both courts had adopted a broader perspective,their holdings might not have
been any different. 30H Their decisions, however, would have recognized that the issues
were far more complex and problematic than they appear from the opinions which were
rendered. In deciding whether to award consequential damages, each court should have
explicitly determined what role technology should play in fashioning a legal rule. If the
Evra courts intended technology to influence their decisions in any way, they should have
described their view of the proper relationship between technology and the law, taking
into account the conflicting interests and values of all participants in the funds transfer
system. Finally, the Evra courts should have considered the impact. of that view on the
30' See id. at 957.
3" See id. The district court found the Swiss Bank's procedures negligent, inter alia, because the
telex confirmed the receipt of the messages even when they were riot being recorded. Evra I, 522 F.
Supp. at 829. The Seventh Circuit ignored the district court's ruling on this point. See Evra II, 673
F.2d 951.
3" Evra II, 673 F.2d at 957.
'307 Id. at 958.
3"" Even if the district court had taken into account the economic impact and operational
consequences of holding the hank liable for consequential damages, it may have concluded these
were reasonable costs to impose upon banks because these costs were substantially outweighed by the
benefits both to customers, and to the integrity and reliability of the payments system. Similarly, even
if the circuit court had looked with more sensitivity at the inadequacy of Swiss Bank's technology, the
reasonableness of the customer's expectations and conduct, and the need for a reliable international
payments system, the court still may have decided it was wiser to place the liability on the customer.
The circuit court may have believed this solution was preferable to the imposition of an uncertain
and possibly significant cost on the banks, which would he passed on to the customer in the form of a
large increase in the cost of sending wire transfers.
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system. Courts dealing with EFT disputes in this manner would be forced to analyze the -
transactions before them in a manner far more likely to provide a fruitful foundation for
the development of optimal legal rules to govern EFT.
C. The Uniform New Paymmas Code
In formulating underlying policy, as well as specific provisions for treating conse-
quential damages in a new code, the drafters of the UN PC might have chosen between the
Iwo very different approaches to technology and the law employed by the Evra courts.
Instead, to some extent the UN PC rejects t he Seventh Circuit's decision as being too harsh
on bank technology and too soft on customers, by denying' consequential damages in
certain situations even when the customer notifies the hank of special circumstances. 309
choosing this path, the UNPC rejects t he humanizing approach to technology to an extent
even greater than the Seventh Circuit.
The UNPC does not explicitly reflect any attitude toward technology in its treatment
of failed transfers of funds. Examining the UNPC's legal rules and comparing them with
the I wo Evra decisions, however, enables one to draw some conclusions about the relation-
ship between the UN PC and technology. Section 101 establishes a contractual relationship
between the customer and his bank. Under this contract t he bank agrees to transfer funds
in accordance with the customer's orcler. 3 '" If t he bank fails to transfer the funds , it is
liable for "all act ual damages proximately caused to the customer.. . ."'"' Specific provi-
sion is made for consequential damages.' Consumers are entitled to consequential
damages when the failure is caused by t he bank maintaining the account which is to be
debited.'" if t he failure had been caused by allot her institution, the UNPC denies the
customer consequential clainages."" Commercial customers are denied consequential
damages in certain instances, even if the failure is caused by the hank maintaining the
account to be debited.'"
Because of the UNPC's differentiated treatment of consequential damages, it seems
not. to have a uniform approach to t he relationship between technology and the law in
regard to the failure to transfer funds. The UNPC's failure to make fundamental policy
decisions concerning this relationship will likely result. in confusion and nonuniform
application of some provisions governing the transfer of funds. This part. of the article,
therefore, examines the problems presented by the UNPC's treatment of liability for
consequential damages by focusing upon the situation in which the consumer's bank fails
to transfer funds properly.
'"9 	supra note 5, at § 411(7).
'th Id. at § 101(1).
"" Id. at § 101(2).
310 Id. at § 101(2)(b),
'" Id.
314 Id. at § 101(2).
313 Id, A commercial customer is allowed consequential damages only under three circum-
stances: (1) if he suffers damages as a result of an arrest or prosecution; (2) in she case of a "draw
order," e.g., a check, the dishonoring of which results from a failure of the customer's hank to
observe the "reasonable commercial standards of its business," and, (3) in the case of a "pay order,"
e.g., a wire transfer, the dishonoring of which result s from an intentional act of the bank. Id. A "good
faith" failure to transfer, however, is not itself an intentional act. Id.
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1. Consumer Transactions
a. Failure by the Consumer's Bank
In a consumer transaction, if the bank maintaining the account to be debited fails to
transfer funds t he bank is liable under the UN PC for "all actual damages proximately
caused ... and such damages may include consequential damages... . "316 For example, if
the consumer's bank fails to transfer funds to a merchant in a point-of-sale electronic
payment mode"' or to a landlord pursuant to a preauthorized hill-paying plan, the
consumer's bank is liable for any consequential damages."" It is also liable for consequent-
ial damages if a consumer receiving government benefits or wages through electronic
transfers into his hank account is not allowed access by the hank to the amount of the
transfer by the time specified in the UNPC. 3"
In general, the UNI'C, relying on Evra II , rest ricts the right of a customer to recover
consequential damages."' The UN PC is justified, however, in not following Evra II and in
allowing customers to collect consequential damages in consumer transactions when
failure to transfer was caused by the consumer's bank, In its Evra 11 decision the Seventh
Circuit was influenced by the "animating principle" of Hadley v. Baxendale which states
that loss associated with an "untoward consequence" should be "borne by the party who
was able to avert I he consequences at least cost...." 321 Evra may have been able to avert
the consequences of a failed transfer at a lower cost than Swiss Bank. It was a sophisticated
corporation and may have been knowledgeable enough to understand the legal and
economic consequences of a late payment. Moreover, Evra may have recognized what
steps it should take to provide sufficient lead time, monitor the progress of the transfer,
notify Swiss Bank of special circumstances and immediately attempt to mitigate damages.
It is not fair, however, to place t his burden on average consumers. Consumers lack the
essential information needed to know how to protect themselves. Furthermore, the
transaction cost of obtaining the information and taking the steps necessary to avoid loss
would make using the bank's services uneconomical, In this situation, therefore, a con-
sumer is not the party able to avoid harm at the least cost.
The UN PC's treatment of consumer transactions in which the failure has been
caused by the consumer's bank is consistent with the humanizers' approach and the
Customer Oriented, and Systems value models."" In Earn 11, the customer was penalized
for trusting bank technology.'" Under the UN PC, the consumer is assured that either the
system will be reliable or he can recover for damages suffered by its lack of reliability. 324
316 Id. at § 101(2).
a ' "Point of sale" refers to the electronic payment system in which a customer pays for goods by
using a plastic card. Grandstaff & Smaistrla, The Payments Mechanism —A Primer on Electronic Funds
Transfer, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA Bus. REV., Sept. 1976, at 7. The card is inserted into a
terminal at the store where the goods are sold. Id. The terminal is connected to a processing unit,
called a switch, which conveys the information about the purchase to the customer's bank. Id. That
hank withdraws money from the customer's bank and sends it to the store's bank account. Id.
78 U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 101(2).
3 '' Id, at § 921.
'2° Id. at § 101, purpose and existing law no. 2, § 4l 1 purpose no. 8.
321 Evra II, 673 F.2d at 957.
322 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
323 Evra II, 673 F.2d at 957.
324 U.N.P.C., supra notes, § 101(2)(h)
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Accordingly, the UNPC both promotes consumer trust in technology and decreases fear
of it.
Banks which employ adequate technology and reasonable procedures should have
little basis to object to the UN PC's allocation of liability. Accidents should be easy to
identify. In consumer transactions, any resulting loss including consequential damages
probably will not amount to a sum onerous for t he bank to incur. The loss may, however,
cause severe deprivation if the consumer has to bear it. The UN PC's treatment of bank
failure in this context contrasts sharply with the U NYC's provisions in the case of a failure
to transfer properly which is caused by a financial institution other than consumer's bank.
b. Failure b' an Institution Other than the Consumer's Bank
Failure to transfer funds may he caused by institutions other than the consumer's
bank. A consumer receiving wages electronically may stiffer loss because of a failure
caused by the employer's bank or an automated clearing house (ACH) which receives the
information from that bank and forwards it to the customer's bank.'" A consumer paying
bills electronically at a merchant's store or pursuant to a preauthorized plan may incur
consequential damages when payment is not made clue io error on the part of the delivery
switch 326 or the merchant's bank. The UNPC treats these "transmittors" and "transmitting
account institutions" differently than the consul -bees bank."' Absent. bad faith, the
former are not liable for consequential damages resulting from failure to act in accor-
dance with reasonable commercial standards. 326 Bad faith is defined in the UNPC as
dishonesty, malice, or "willful or reckless disregard of known material facts." 326 The
comment to this definition specifically states that bad faith is not "[m]ere negligence or
action based on incomplete knowledge. , . ."""Evra II is mentioned in the comment to the
section limiting consequential damages and its reasoning is used to justify the rule. 331
Limiting the liability of these other institutions seems reasonable if' one considers the
issue only in terms of the institutions' lack of special knowledge about the transfer and the
enormous number of transfers they handle."' On the whole, however, this limitation is
not justified. Consumer transfers do not involve the risk of enormous consequential •
damages possible in commercial transactions. More important, limiting liability does not
take into account an institution's use of technology and procedures to manage technolog-
ical systems. It is clear from the comments to the definition of bad faith and through the
references to Evra II, that deployment of Swiss Bank's neandert hal technological system is
not considered bad faith."' An institution, in effect, therefore, is authorized to act in a
commercially unreasonable way. If it does so, it risks only nonconsequential damages up
225 NCEFT, supra note 34, at 206.
Id. at 210. The term "switch" refers to the system used to route payment transfer information
from one institution to another. Id.
"7 U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 411. "Transminors" and "transmitting account institutions" are
defined in section 53. Id.
328 Id. at § 411(7).
329 Id. at § 50(3).
33° Id. purpose and existing law no. 3.
351 Id. § 411, purpose no. 8.
332 Id. at 264. See also amicus curiae Brief of ihe New York Clearing House Association and
American Bankers Association at 4, Ema H.
U.N.P.C., supra note 5, § 50 purpose no. 3, § 411, purpose no. 8.
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to a maximum of the amount of the order. Ordinarily this amount will be small in most
consumer transactions. Only by engaging in the extreme conduct falling within the
UN PC's definition of bad faith does the institution risk incurring consequential damages.
By limiting the liability of institutions other than the consumer's bank, the UNPC
implicitly rejects the notion that law should be used to control the social dimensions of
technology. The Customer Oriented model is abandoned. The consumer is at the mercy of
defective systems. In many instances, discovering which transmit tor is responsible for a
transfer error will be difficult and expensive." 4
 If the consumer does not have at least the
prospect of recovering consequential damages, it may not be worth the effort hiring a
lawyer, determining the source of the error, and suing only for the amount of the
transfer. If consumers have no effective means of enforcing their rights when errors
occur, transmittors have no incentive to improve their technological systems, unless so
many failed and erroneous transfers occur that a substantial number of consumers
abandon those payment systems. The Statist model is also spurned by the UNPC because
the limit on liability ignores the nation's need for a reliable payments system.
In sum, the UNPC approach is not advisable because it fails to accommodate the
conflicting societal interests involved and treats whatever level of technology institutions
happen to use as the determinant of legal rules. The UNPC should therefore be revised to
protect a transmittor and transmitting account institution from liability for consequential
damages only if they can sustain the burden of proving t hat. they used technology and
management. systems reasonably capable of properly transferring funds, taking into
consideration the state of the art at the time of the failure.
Unlike consumer transactions, commercial transactions typically involve customers
who are far better able to obtain necessary information about the benefits and risks of
electronic transfers and more likely to have the resources needed to protect themselves if
a transfer fails to occur as planned. The UN PC provisions on consequential damages in
commercial transactions considered in the next section should be viewed in that context.
2. Commercial Transactions
a. Failure by the Customer's Bank
Under the UNPC, the liability of the commercial customer's bank for consequential
damages resulting from f"ailure to transfer funds varies depending upon the type of
transfer involved and the conduct of the hank in regard to each type. 335
 Regardless of the
circumstances, the bank may escape liability for consequential damages even if it fails to
maintain an adequate level of technology and management systems.
In a situation where the customer issues a "draw order" such as a check, the bank is
liable for consequential damages if' the transfer error results from the failure of the bank
"to observe the reasonable commercial standards of its business. . ..”'" The UNPC does
not, however, define reasonable commercial standards. A certain degree of vagueness is
probably warranted; since technology will certainly develop over time, it is inadvisable for
334
 See generally Budnitz, Federal Regulation of Consumer Disputes in Computer Ranking Transactions,
20 HARV. J. ON LEGi5, 21, 76-79 1983. If the consumer successfully invokes the U.N.P.C.'s error
resolution procedure, his bank is required to "request" any other institution which transferred the
funds to determine if it committed the error if' the consumer's bank considers such a request
"appropriate." U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 303(1),
333
 U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 101(2)(c), (d).
"" Id. at § 101(2)(c).
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the UNPC to define precisely what technological standard is commercially reasonable.
These standards can be developed by the case law over time and in response to specific
problems which arise. Nonetheless, the UN PC's approach is too vague. No guidance
whatever is given to courts. Should a court decide reasonableness solely in terms of the
practices of the bank before it, or in terms of practices of other banks in the community,
region or nation? Should the court consider the state of the art or the need for a reliable
national payments systems? Upon whom does t he burden of proof lie — on the customer
to show a lack of reasonableness, or on the bank to demonstrate the observance of
reasonable standards? The UNPC provides no answers to these questions.
The failure of the UNPC to provide guidance on these issues reflects a failure to
determine the proper relationship between technology, society and the law. if the propo-
nents of the UN PC decide to follow the private enterprise model, technology should be
!ell free of legal restraints to develop in the market place. A bank should be able to use
whatever level of technology it wants and the market dictates. if a customer is harmed, it
is assumed that other customers will learn of his loss and will use other bank services or
will go to other banks. In order to compete the hank will then have to improve its
technology. if customers value reliable systems they will make this desire knoWn and he
willing to pay for this feature, and some banks in the market will offer such systems.
Under the private enterprise model, courts would not focus on the needs and expecta-
tions of t he customer or the interests of the state. Rather, the burden would be on the
commercial customer to prove the technology was of such poor quality and/or manage-
ment systems were so careless, that the hank should be considered as acting in bad faith.
. Alternatively, the proponents of the UNPC may determine that the law should be used to
insure that hank technology meets minimal performance standards so that the country is
assured of a somewhat reliable national payments system and customers can expect a basic
level of service. If that is the objective of the UNPC, it. should he clearly stated in t he Code.
The t rouble with t he present draft is that no guidance is given as to what type of
relationship between law and technology the UNPC is attempting to achieve. As a result,
each judge will be forced to decide for himself which model to apply. Each judge
reviewing a commercial transaction will he influenced by whether he views technology as a
bane or a salvation, controllable or autonomous. Because each judge is free to apply any
value model which suits him, a nonuniform definition of reasonable commercial stan-
dards will result.
"Pay orders, - such as wire transfers, are treated differently under the UN PC than the
draw orders discussed above. if the customer issues a "pay order," the bank is liable for
consequential damages only if its failure to transfer was intentional, as in the situation of
an unlawful setoff."' The Swiss Bank's conduct in Evra, when engaged in by the cus-
tomer's own bank rather than a correspondent, is excluded from the definition of an
intentional act.'" if Continental Bank had possessed technology and procedures compar-
able to Swiss Bank's, it would not have been liable for consequential damages under the
U N PC.'"
This provision governing pay orders seems to reflect a policy decision that law should
not be used to insure a minimal performance level for hank technology and systems. This
limitation of liability for consequential damages is justified in the comment, which states
that because the customer knows how important a timely transfer is to him, he should
337 Id. at § 101(2)(d).
33 ' Id. purpose and existing law no. 2.
338 Id.
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allow adequate lead time or obtain insurance. 340 No explanation is offered in the UNPC or
the comments for determining liability for draw orders under a standard different from
that established for pay orders. By focusing on the intentional nature of the act when wire
transfers are used, the UNPC seems to reject the commercial reasonableness standard
applied to check processing. While the UN PC apparently rejects any role for the law in
insuring a level of performance for pay order technology, it is not clear what the role of
law is to be in regard to draw order technology. A different role is implied by the different
test in each provision."' It is strange, however, that the relationship between law and
technology would vary depending upon whether a draw order or a pay order were used.
A preferable approach would be for the UNPC's drafters to take a position on the
relationship between law and technology in the commercial sphere, and explicitly state
the value models upon which the position is based. This position should then be applied
uniformly regardless of whether pay or draw orders are involved. if the drafters prefer to
stay with the present scheme, they should explain more precisely what commercial
reasonableness means in regard to technological systems, and should justify the lack of
any requirement for commercially reasonable technology in regard to pay orders.
A discussion of the UNPC's treatment of the liability of institutions other than the
commercial customer's bank follows below. As in its provisions on the liability of the
commercial customer's bank, an evaluation of the UNPC is hampered by the Code's
failure to define clearly the relationship between the law and technology. Moreover,
explaining that relationship in the Code or commentary accompanying it would facilitate
judicial application of its provisions.
b. Failure by an Institution Other than the Customer's Bank
As in consumer transactions, institutions other than the customer's bank are pro-
tected from consequential damages for failure to conduct their affairs in a commercially
reasonable manner, absent bad faith. The liability of these institutions for nonconsequen-
tial damages is limited to the amount of the item."' This standard is consistent with the
UCC, but stricter than Evra 11 . 343 Although the limitation on consequential damages can
be justified more easily in this instance than in consumer transfers, the UNPC's approach
to the relationship between technology and the law is subject to criticism.
The UNPC and the UCC both limit the bank's loss to the amount of the transfer. 344
Unlike consumer transactions, the consequential damages in commercial transfers may be
far in excess of the amount of the transfer and not. reasonably foreseeable. In addition,
commercial parties can better take care of themselves. 395 It is more difficult, however, to
justify the manner in which the UCC and UNPC go even beyond Evra II by limiting any
recovery to the amount of the item. In Evra II, the court allowed Evra to recover not only
the amount of the transfer, but also any fee paid for the transfer and any interest lost due to
the failed transfer. 346
 These additional losses are considered "direct" or "general" damages,
34° Id,
3" Compare id. at § 101(2)(c) with id. at § 101(2)(d).
34' Id. at § 411(7).
343 U.C.C. § 4-103(5); Evra II, 673 F.2d at 955-56; see also infra notes 346 & 348 and accompany-
ing text.
3" U.C.C. § 4-103(5) (1978); U.N.P.C., supra note 5.
34' See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
3" Evra 11, 673 F.2d at 955.
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and are distinct from consequential damages. 347. It is unclear why the UCC and the UNPC
do not allow recovery of these damages. They are not subject to any of the objections made
against allowing consequentials. In addition, Evra II would apparently have allowed
consequential damages if Evra had informed Swiss Bank of the special circumstances
surrounding its transfers. 349 if Swiss Bank had agreed to make the transfers in light of this
information, the court would have imposed the greater measure of datnages. 349 Both the
UCC and the UNPC, however, preclude consequentials even when the bank has this
information, unless bank conduct amounts to had faith. 3"
Protecting the bank from consequential damages when the bank knows of the special
circumstances seems to be overly solicitous of t he bank's interests. Customers who have
informed financial institutions of their special circumstances reasonably would expect the
bank to be liable for consequential damages in t he event of injury due to a subsequent
failed transfer if the bank continues to make payments without notifying the customer of
its unwillingness to assume responsibility in light of the special circumstances. Although
the UNPC and the UCC preclude liability regardless of the customer's reasonable expec-
tations, one possible escape exists in both codes. The customer may argue that his
disclosure of special circumstances and the hank's continued transfers without any dis-
claimer of liability amounts to an agreement to vary the provisions of these codes. 35 ' The
UN PC should clearly provide that such action by customers and banks does constitute an
agreement to vary the code and the bank will be liable for consequential damages.
The UNPC does not explain why it rejects a policy designed to promote commercially
reasonable behavior. Instead it justifies limiting liability by saying that these institutions
should not run the risk of incurring consequential damages because of the large number
of transfers they process. 352 It is unclear, however, why the large number of orders
processed should serve as an excuse for engaging in commercially unreasonable behavior.
In addition, the UNPC supports limiting liability by pointing out that banks lack any
knowledge of special circumstances. " 3 But the UNPC then establishes a rule which
restricts liability even if special circumstances are disclosed. 354
Several assumptions may underlie the approach of the UNPC toward technology in
t his setting. The drafters may have assumed the cost of maintaining reliable technology is
prohibitive. There is reason to doubt, however, that the cost is excessive. For example, the
cost of a telex machine which shuts off automatically when out of paper, and which
produces copies is not substantially greater than one without these features. 355 If the
UN PC is premised on contrary cost estimates these should be documented..Perhaps the
drafters believed that the law simply should not interfere with private enterprise's use of
technology. They may have regarded technology as an independent variable and law as a
347 hi.
348
 Id. at 955-56.
.149 id .
U.C.C. § 4-103(5) (1978); U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at. § 411(7),
551 U.C.C. § 4-103 and U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at § 3(1) provide that the provisions of each code
may be varied by agreement.
352 U.N.P.C., supra notes, § 411 purpose no. 8.
3" Id.
3" Id. at § 411(7).
355 Telephone interview with G.B. Cox, Manfacturer's Representative, Extel Corporation in
Atlanta, Georgia (August 16, 1983).
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dependent variable. The UN PC's treatment of liability is consistent with these ap-
proaches, 356
The issue raised here is not whether the UNPC's liability provisions for commercial
transactions reflect wise policy. Rather, a preliminary matter must be addressed in the •
Code. What. is needed is a clear statement of the UNPC's position regarding the relation-
ship between law and technology. If the intention of the drafters is to reject the Statist and
Customer Oriented value models, that rejection should he justified. If their intention is to
limit liability in a manner which is in harmony with treating technology as autonomous
and as an independent variable, the drafters must explain why technology should he
regarded in this manner.
Before another version of the UNPC is proposed, scholars and practitioners should
discuss and determine whether the relationship between technology, society and the law
which is reflected in the present draft is the most appropriate one. if the current. UNPC's
conception of that relationship is faulty, discussion about individual proviSions is prema-
ture and probably misguided; it focuses on t he symptoms rather than the disease itself.
The critical impediment to fruitful analysis is the lack of a stated position on the relation-
ship. Unless that is forthcoming, all one can do is guess at the drafter's underlying
conception by trying to discern that conception from specific provisions. If one disagrees
with the provision, one cannot know the true nature of the disagreement. It. may originate
from a view of the relationship which varies from the drafters'. Alternatively, both the
drafters and the commentator may share the same conception, but merely disagree on its
application.
For example, in regard to the provision limiting the liability of institutions other than
the commercial customer's bank, one cannot be sure that the drafters intended totally to
reject any role for the law in governing technological performance. Perhaps they did not
so intend, and assumed that the good faith requirement would insure a minimal level of
technological performance. If the provision is based on that assumption, then one can
analyze the provision on that basis. One may argue, for instance, that a good faith
standard in effect does nothing to insure any reasonable level of technological perfor-
mance (reasonable in regard to the Statist, Systems and Customer Oriented models)
because of the narrow definition of had faith. One way to make the good faith standard
more effective in promoting reliable technological performance might be to broaden the
definition of bad faith, at least for purposes of this section. The revised had faith
definition would include failure to maintain technological systems reasonably capable of
properly transferring funds given the current state of the art. Alternatively, the Code
could allow consequential damages for failure to observe reasonable commercial stan-
dards, but impose a cap. For example, the maximum allowable amount might be fixed at
one million dollars per failed transfer. Banks would then have an incentive to maintain
decent technology and would be able to insure themselves if they believed that they risked
incurring damages. The limit would protect them from enormous losses and provide a
level of certainty with which they could plan.
Unfortunately, commentators making suggestions such as those above are working in a
vacuum, because they have no way to gauge whether their disagreement stems from a
difference of opinion over how to apply a common conception of the role of technology in
devising a legal system, or originates from a totally different conception of that role. A
See U.N.P.C., supra note 5, at. § 411(7), Precluding liability for consequential damages in
U.N.P.C. § 411(7) removes significant incentives for banks to improve their technology. This is
consistent with the approaches discussed in the text.
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policy statement explaining the UNPC's intended relationship to technology would greatly
assist the national debate. In addition, such a policy formulation in the version of the Code
finally enacted would guide judges in interpreting the Code and promote its uniform
application.
CONCLUSION
Statutes and case law on stop payment and funds transfers illustrate the need to strive
for a better understanding of both the relationship between law and technology and the
factors which should be considered in resolving problems created by bank technology.
Current law often rests on unexpressed assumptions about the role of law and technology
and is devoid of careful thought and analysis. It fails to provide consistent legal guidance
and precedent. As a result, some cases and statutes may unduly inhibit electronic banking,
while others may unwisely give it totally free rein. This state of affairs is a disservice to
banks, customers and rational technological development, all of which need a legal system
characterized by predictability, rationality and consistency. 357
Courts and legislatures must determine the appropriate relationship between tech-
nology, banking transactions and the law in order to rectify this situation. This task is
complicated by differing views of technology held by various - members of society and the
conflicting value systems of parties with an interest in the operation of payment systems.
For this reason, a precise formulation of the ideal relationship is not possible. There is no
indisputably correct concept merely awaiting discovery by someone with the perspicacity
to develop the necessary methodology. 35g It is possible, nevertheless, for courts and
legislatures to confront the challenge directly, and to consider the numerous views and
value models espoused by others. Whatever legal rules are adopted, the decision maker
should explicitly acknowledge his position on the relationship between law and technol-
ogy, justify that position, and explain how he has applied that position to the situation
before him.`59 As each legal rule is applied in ever more situations, the wisdom of the rule
and the underlying approach to the relationship between law and technology can be
evaluated. In light of that evaluation, improved approaches to the relationship can be
designed and more appropriate legal rules developed.
357
	 mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty." Vallejo v. Wheeler, 1
Cowp. 143, 153, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017 (1774), quoted in Mellinkoff, .supra note 203, at 223.
3" See generally Danzig, supra note 203, at 624.
3" Ethical and political choices are involved in developing commercial law. Id. at 630. There are
no "sell-evidently" correct answers. Id. 'Therefore, issues should he resolved in a "self-conscious,
visible way.. ..- Id.
